

Explaining Donald Trump's Support: Cultural Lag or Cultural Backlash?

By

Katherine Rocha, Chris Sabetta and Roger Clark

Rhode Island College

Abstract

The authors employ Ogburn's (1922) concept of cultural lag to gain insight into why Donald Trump's supporters voted for him in the 2016 Presidential election. Rocha, Sabetta, and Clark posit that economic and technological changes created a sense of ill being, or malaise, among a large portion of the white working class and that this malaise made voters unusually susceptible to the populist themes of the Trump candidacy. The authors analyze Gallup's (2017) "State of the States" poll results for 2016 to examine the degree to which Trump's margin of victory over Clinton in the 50 states (data from The Cook Political Report 2017) can be explained by the variables of 1) the percentage of state residents who identify as Republican or who identify as independent but say they lean Republican and 2) a state's score on Gallup's overall "Well-Being" index." This index is comprised of five elements of well-being that are the core components of the best possible life: purpose, social, financial, community and physical." The authors report that, *at the state level*, once the degree to which a population identified as Republican was controlled, there was a strong, negative correlation between its overall well being and Trump's electoral margins. Rocha, Sabetta, and Clark use the American National Election study data from 2016 and 2012, at the *individual level*, to show that the 2016 election was *unusually* influenced by attitudes that constituted a kind of cultural backlash to progressive viewpoints about blacks, immigrants, gays and lesbians, and women. The data show that these attitudes had stronger controlled associations with a vote for Trump than measures of current economic and educational deprivation.

Keywords: cultural lag, economic insecurity, cultural backlash, populism

INTRODUCTION

Asked why Donald Trump won the 2016 Presidential election, pundits give about as many answers as there are, well, pundits. Answers include, for example, Comey's announcement of the reopening of the Clinton investigation; Hillary Clinton's poor candidacy; Mrs. Clinton's e-mail scandal; Russian interference in the election process; the fact that Presidents are not elected by popular vote; Trump's supporters' addiction to "The Apprentice;" and so on.

Although these answers may each have some validity, none is particularly sociological. And none feels like an adequate answer to the basic question: what made

a sufficient slice of the American populace so ready and perhaps eager to vote for a political novice, with some evident *peccadillos*, that any of these peculiarities, or even some combination of them, could tip the scale? This really is the central question of this paper, one that we address through two lenses: a cultural lag lens and a cultural backlash lens. The former leads us to believe that support for Trump's candidacy was born out of economic insecurity in a substantial part of the electorate. The latter, that it was the result of a resentment of a "silent revolution" in attitudes, a revolution that deprived many whites of their sense of privilege in American society.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Using the “Cultural Lag” Lens

We thought that the theme of this issue of *SBG*, cultural lag, might hold the clue to Donald Trump’s electoral success. We knew that at least one faction of Trump supporters (e.g., white working-class men and their families) had experienced a buffeting by the winds of economic and technological change. While such changes also affected working-class people of other racial and ethnic backgrounds, white working-class men and their families were more susceptible to Trump’s campaign themes about job creation and job security.

The sources of this buffeting have been well documented. By the 1960s, in fact, the switch to a knowledge-based economy in the United States had begun and the industrial economy began to thin. Managers and engineers, always interested in increasing productivity, produced automated factories that employed fewer people. By the 1970s, corporations began to replace old factories with new ones in countries with low-cost labor. Initially this loss of manufacturing jobs hit black men hardest, but by the 1980s the losses hit less-educated whites as well (Kenschaft, Clark and Ciambrone 2016: 41-42). The more recent acceleration of computing power, what Thomas Friedman (2016) calls “the supernova,” promises to threaten the traditional working-class job market even more.

The effects of all this economic and technological change have been uneven in the United States, as elsewhere. Real family incomes for the top 20 percent of families rose by a little over 75 percent between 1967 and 2013. Meanwhile those for the next 40 percent rose by less than 30 percent, and have actually fallen substantially since 2000, and those for the next 40 percent have risen much less, and also fallen since 2000 (Reeves 2015). Social scientists as politically disparate as Charles Murray (2012) and Robert Putnam (2015) have pointed to an increasing bifurcation in the experiences, opportunities, and prospects for children between what Murray calls “The New Upper Class” and the “New Lower Class.” Murray demonstrates convincingly that this divide is as significant among white Americans as it is among any other group.

The relationship between the income inequality and opportunity inequality has not been simple or instantaneous. Murray (2012) and Putnam (2015) both suggest that it took decades for economic troubles “to undermine family structures and community supports” (Putnam 2015: 228). As marriage became less common and divorce more common among the “new lower class,” children experienced gaps in parenting, developing lower commitments to education and lower chances for intergenerational mobility. Fear regarding and resentment for these situations was natural, as well as for government actors who continued, as one of Hochschild’s (2016: 52) respondents put it, “come down on the little guy,” over-regulating the little guy, but under-regulating guys at the top.

In his 2015 book, *Our Kids: The American Dream in Crisis*, Putnam under-scored the potential for “antidemocratic extremism” that the presence of a new lower class, faced increasingly with few personal opportunities, but also few opportunities for their children, poses. As he put it:

[U]nder severe economic and international pressures . . . the “inert” mass might suddenly prove highly volatile and open to manipulation by anti-democratic demagogues at the ideological extremes (pp. 239-240).

So one view of Trump’s victory suggests that many of his supporters were victims of long-term economic upheaval in the U. S., seeking to express their dissatisfaction with the way the country had left them and their children behind. They voted for Trump, according to this view, because he spoke to their economic insecurities and promised to create the jobs that would enable them to once again achieve respectable middle-class status for themselves and a hopeful future for their children. An added benefit was that Donald Trump promised to shake up the Washington establishment.

More generally, Donald Trump has been viewed as embodying the characteristics of a populist candidate, one who extols the wisdom of “ordinary people” ahead of the views of elites (e.g., media pundits and elected politicians). Populism, according to Inglehart and Norris (2016: 6-7) is a philosophy that often favors the personal power of charismatic leaders, preferring direct majoritarian democratic rule over a system of checks and balances. Donald Trump’s embrace of these

principles, the cultural lag perspective implies, made him particularly attractive to people with less education, lower levels of income and wealth, and a greater sense that the economy was failing because it promised to address their economic insecurities.

Therefore, the cultural lag perspective led us to propose the following four hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: People with lower incomes would have been more likely to vote for Trump than people with higher incomes.

Hypothesis 2: People with less wealth would have been more likely to vote for Trump than people with more wealth.

Hypothesis 3: People with less education would have been more likely to vote for Trump than people with more education.

Hypothesis 4: People who felt the economy was doing badly would have been more likely to vote for Trump than people who felt the economy was doing well.

Using the “Cultural Backlash” Lens

“Cultural backlash” refers to a reaction against progressive cultural movements. The cultural backlash perspective can be seen as focusing on second-level, attitudinal implications of economic and technological change, especially for people who may previously have seen themselves as privileged in society, but now feel victimized by liberal movements and attitudes. This perspective suggests that there has been a “silent revolution” in values in many Western nations, coinciding with the rise of knowledge-based economies (e.g., Inglehart 1977), that has been associated with a rise of multiculturalism, advocacy for environmental protection, human rights, and gender equality. Like many such “revolutions,” this one has inspired a backlash most particularly among those who have seen their privilege and status challenged by liberals and by economic change. These revolutions have left many whites feeling, as Arlie Hochschild’s (2016) book title states, *Strangers in Their Own Land*.

Hochschild’s qualitative research into the lives and convictions of conservatives, who, in her study, were largely white, uncovers deep-seated fears of being culturally eclipsed. Her Louisiana respondents did in fact fear economic decline, but were conceivably even more motivated by resentments about “line cutters,”

groups who seem, through affirmative action programs of the federal government, to have been given a leg up in colleges and universities, jobs and welfare programs. Hochschild summarizes:

Women, immigrants, refugees, public sector workers—where will it end? Your money is running through a liberal sympathy sieve you don’t control or agree with. These are opportunities you’d have loved to have had in your day—and either you should have had them when you were young or the young shouldn’t be getting them now. It’s not fair (2016: 137).

Hochschild is careful about labeling her respondents, and by extension other, primarily white, conservatives, as racist, sexist, anti-immigrant or homophobic. Many, she implies, probably are racist by definitions used by sociologists—e.g., believers “in a natural hierarchy that places blacks at the bottom” (2016: 147). She points out, however, that most are explicitly not racist by their own definitions of the word—people who use the “N” word or who hate blacks. We too would like to avoid such labels.

Donald Trump spoke to the sense of unfairness felt by many “new lower class” whites. He openly criticized immigrants from Mexico and Muslim countries, and was cheered. Openly demanded that “Black Lives Matter” protesters be kicked out of his rallies, and garnered vocal crowd support. Hochschild makes this observation about a rally she observed:

He [Trump] was throwing off not only a set of “politically correct” attitudes, but a set of *feeling rules*—that is, a set of ideas about the right way to feel regarding blacks, women, immigrants, gays . . . (2016: 227).

The cultural backlash perspective led us to propose a number of other hypotheses about the 2016 presidential election. Specifically, we came to expect:

Hypothesis 5: People who feel that blacks have *not* been particularly disadvantaged are more likely than others to have voted for Trump.

Hypothesis 6: People who would like to halt immigration into the country are more likely than others to have voted for Trump.

Hypothesis 7: People who feel that discrimination against gays and lesbians is tolerable are more likely than others to have voted for Trump.

Hypothesis 8: People who feel that discrimination against women is tolerable are more likely to have voted for Trump than others.

Our reading of the cultural lag and cultural backlash perspectives together led us to believe that, at the state level, those state populations expressing the greatest overall well being would be less likely to vote for Trump than those expressing the least overall well being. Hence, we proposed our last (ninth) hypothesis:

Hypothesis 9: At the state level, Trump's margin of victory will have been inversely related to the proportion of the population expressing a sense of overall well being, even once the proportion of the population of the population classifying itself as Republican is controlled.

RESEARCH APPROACH and PRINCIPAL VARIABLES

This article is based primarily on secondary analysis of two timely data sets: Gallup's (2017) "State of the States" poll results for 2016 and the American National Election Study (ANES) for 2016 and 2012.¹ We use the Gallup data to determine the degree to which Trump's margin of victory (or defeat) over Clinton in the 50 states (data from The Cook Political Report, 2017) can be explained by two variables: the percentage of state residents who identify as Republican or who identify as independent but say they lean toward Republican and a state's score on Gallup's overall "Well-Being" index, "made up of five elements of well-being that are the core components of the best possible life: purpose, social, financial, community and physical." Our goal is to ascertain the degree to which a lack of "well-being," the closest measure of state-wide despair we have found, can account for Trump's success, above and beyond what could have expected based on the political identification of states' populations.

Since 1948, ANES has employed a sample of American voters in every presidential election in order to help researchers determine the characteristics and attitudes of voters that led to the election result in each presidential election. We use the ANES data to determine how various indicators of voter economic insecurity and cultural backlash, at the individual,

¹ The ANES data were available through Berkeley University's (2017) "Survey Documentation and Analysis" website.

rather than at the state, level may have contributed to Trump's electoral success. We choose indicators based on their availability in both the 2012 presidential election, involving primarily Mitt Romney and Barack Obama and in order to estimate their relative salience in the 2016 election. Comparing the two elections is crucial for determining the degree to which certain characteristics and attitudes stand out in the 2016 election. Thus, for instance, even if we find that a concern about immigrants distinguished Trump voters from Clinton voters, we cannot be sure that this attitude was particularly salient in the 2016 election unless we can determine that it was less important in previous elections.

Our dependent variable in the 2016 election is whether a respondent voted for Clinton (coded 0) or Trump (coded 1). Our dependent variable in the 2012 election is whether s/he voted for Obama (coded 0) or Romney (coded 1).

We use four measures of economic status and possible insecurity as independent variables. Three of these tap respondents' economic condition and the fourth, an attitude towards the economy. The first independent variable is a measure of family income (INCOME).² The second independent variable is a rough measure of wealth, based on whether a respondent claimed to own stock or not (STOCK). The third independent variable is a measure of education (EDUCATION).³ The fourth independent variable is a measure of economic condition (ECONOMY).⁴ The cultural lag perspective leads us to expect that people with lower family income, without stocks, with less education and with negative ratings of the economy are more likely to have voted for Trump than people with higher incomes, with stocks, with more education and with positive ratings of the economy.

We also have four measures of the degree to which respondents are gripped by a negative reaction to progressive value changes—that is, are part of a cultural

² INCOME has 28 categories, ranging from "under \$5,000" to "\$250,000 or more."

³ EDUCATION has five categories, ranging from "less than a high school credential" to "a graduate degree."

⁴ ECONOMY is operationalized by a respondent's rating of the economy on a five-category scale from "very good" to "very bad."

backlash against certain categories of people. One measure has to do with the degree to which they disagree with the statement that “Blacks have gotten less than they deserve” (BLACKS). A second measure focuses on the degree to which they think the media should pay less attention to discrimination against women (WOMEN).⁵ A third measure is whether they say “no” to the question “should laws protect gays and lesbians from job discrimination” (GAYS). And the fourth measure, a four-category scale measuring the degree to which respondents think that government should define unauthorized immigrants as felons and send them back to their home countries (IMMIGRANTS). Unfortunately, in regard to measuring anti-immigrant feeling, this last variable does not have the greatest face validity in the 2016 ANES survey. An alternative measure of this variable was available in the 2016. We could not use the alternative variable because there was no comparable indicator present in the 2012 survey.⁶ However, analyses not presented here suggest that the more valid, alternative measure of anti-immigrant feeling actually shows a stronger association with presidential choice than IMMIGRANT, so using the variable IMMIGRANT in our analysis probably offers a conservative estimate of the degree to which anti-immigrant sentiment drove Trump voters.

We use five control variables in our analyses: political party affiliation; race; gender; age; and the importance of religion to the respondent.⁷ Republicans were undoubtedly more likely to vote for Trump than voters with other political identifications.⁸ We expected that

⁵ We want to point out that the wording of this statement may needlessly confuse voter attitudes towards women with their attitudes towards the media as well as their attitudes towards Hillary Clinton, a female candidate. However, we found no more reliable indicator of attitudes towards women in the 2016 and 2012

⁶ One variable (available in 2016), based on a question about what should happen to United States immigration levels (from “increase them a lot” to “decrease them a lot”) does not confuse, as the variable IMMIGRANTS might be seen to do, attitudes towards immigration with attitudes towards *illegal* immigration.

⁷ Political party affiliation is coded as Republican = 1 and not Republican = 0. Self-identified race is coded as 1 = white and 0 = not white. Gender (GENDER) is coded as 1 = female and 0 = male. Age (AGE) is coded as age in years; and the importance of religion to the respondent (RELIGION) is coded as 1 = religion important and 0 = religion not important.

Republicans, whites, males, older voters, and people who said religion was important would be more likely to vote for Trump than non-Republicans, non-whites, females, younger voters and people who said religion was not important.

RESULTS

We report results from Pearson correlation and linear regression analyses for overwhelming theoretical considerations, despite the fact that many of our variables do not meet the assumptions required of such statistical techniques.⁹ Normally, it would be preferable to use logit or probit regression analysis, for instance, when the dependent variable is dichotomous, especially when one of the categories of the variable is relatively rare. But rarity is not a problem for the dependent variables in this analysis: all four candidates—Trump, Clinton, Romney and Obama—received substantial proportions of the votes. And simple linear regression provides statistics—in this case, standardized regression coefficients (betas)—that enable the comparison of the strength of controlled associations of various independent variables on the dependent variable. These are crucial comparisons for this study. In analyses *not* reported in this paper, we have done logit regression and find that results are stable over the two types of regression regime (i.e., for simple linear and logit regression).

Our initial research question had to do with how much of Trump's margins at the state level, which is, after all, how elections are decided, could be accounted for in terms of general malaise, dissatisfaction or despair among the electorate. We therefore regressed Trump's margin at the state level on two variables: one, the percentage of state residents self-identifying as Republican; the other, the index measuring overall wellbeing. As Table 1 suggests, once the percentage

⁸ We had a choice between two variables: one measured the degree to which voters considered themselves Republican (with strong Republicans being on one end of a 7-category scale and strong Democrats being on the other); one measured whether they identified as Republican or not. As it turns out, findings do not substantially differ when either indicator is used, but we use the latter in the analyses presented here.

⁹ Quite a few of the variables we analyze are *not* measured at the interval level and those that are, even our dependent variable, the candidate for whom people voted, are typically two-category dummy variables.

of Republicans is controlled, the association between Trump's margin and index of overall wellbeing was strong, significant and negative ($\beta = -.19$). (See Table 1.)

Table 1. Regression of Trump Margin by State on the Percentage of the State Population Reporting That It Is Republican (REPUBLICAN) and Overall Wellbeing Index (WELLBEING)

Standardized Regression Coefficients (Betas)	
REPUBLICAN	.91***
WELLBEING	-.19***
N of States	50
Adjusted R-square	.92

However, if "ill being," the opposite of "well being," was a significant predictor of Trump's margin of victory at the state level, the question arises as to what was the nature of this "ill being" at the individual level. The cultural lag and the cultural backlash perspectives on support for populism provide three testable hypotheses. Table 2 shows fundamental support, even while it also reveals some surprises. We begin with our control variables in the regression analyses presented here. Comparison between the 2016 and 2012 elections suggests that, at the zero-order level, REPUBLICAN (r in 2016 = .61; r in 2012 = .64) was slightly less salient in the 2016 than in the 2012 election. Race, gender and age had about the same salience in the 2016 election as they did in the 2012 election. But the importance of religion to a voter was actually considerably more salient in the 2016 election ($r = .26$) than it was in 2012 ($r = .11$). People who defined themselves as religious were much more likely to vote for Trump than Clinton. They were even more likely to do that than religious voters were to vote for Romney than Obama.

Table 2 also offers support for hypotheses derived from the cultural lag perspective. However, this support is sometimes only evident when one contrasts the 2016 results with the 2012 results. Thus, the negligible correlation between INCOME and a vote for Trump in 2016 ($r = .01$) would not immediately support the

hypothesis that income affected the 2016 result, if it were not for the fact that, by contrast, Romney voters tended to have considerably more income than Obama voters ($r = .14$). As a general rule, Republicans tend to be higher earners than Democrats. The 2016 election proved to be the rule's exception, suggesting that many income-strapped voters did in fact vote for Trump. Similarly, voters without a stock portfolio were only a little more likely to vote for Trump than Clinton in the 2016 election (r for STOCKS = $-.07$), but, compared to the non-existent relationship in the 2012 election ($r = .00$), this difference suggests that Trump's candidacy was relatively effective at drawing voters with little wealth.

The other two hypotheses derived from the cultural lag perspective are also supported, but, in this case, the support is somewhat undermined by the comparison with 2012 results. It is widely believed, for instance, that less educated voters were more likely to vote for Trump than Clinton, and the correlation between EDUCATION and a Trump vote ($r = -.12$) supports this belief. But the fact that the correlation between EDUCATION and a Romney vote was stronger ($r = -.16$) suggests that education may not have been quite as telling in the 2016 election as it was in the 2012 election. It is also a common belief that those who felt the economy was doing badly were more likely to vote for Trump than Clinton, and the correlation between ECONOMY and a Trump vote ($r = .48$) would appear to be strong support for this view. But, when one sees that the correlation between a Romney vote and ECONOMY in 2012 was even stronger ($r = .58$), one is led to entertain the possibility that disappointment with the economy's performance does not completely explain Trump's success, or at least was not as salient a factor in the 2016 election as it was in the 2012 election.

In contrast, the correlation coefficients reported in Table 2 show both absolute and relative support for all of the hypotheses derived from the cultural backlash perspective. BLACKS, measuring the extent to which voters *disagreed* with the statement that "Blacks have gotten less than they deserve," was strongly correlated with voting for Trump ($r = .54$), even more strongly than it was with votes for Romney when he was running against a black incumbent whom some Americans resented ($r = .47$). Voting for Trump was more highly correlated with disagreement with the feeling that gays and lesbians should not be discriminated against ($r = .30$) than voting for Romney was (.25), even though, in

both cases, the correlation is relatively high. Negative feelings about undocumented immigrants was much more strongly correlated with a vote for Trump ($r=.44$) than it was with a vote for Romney (.28), though in neither case was the correlation weak. And negative feelings about media attention to discrimination against women was much more strongly associated with a vote for Trump (.49) than it was with a vote for Romney (.35), although, again, in both cases the correlation is strikingly high. (See Table 2.)

It is, of course, possible that some of the insights available from Table 2 would require modification when we examine the associations of independent variables with voting behavior, controlling for other variables. Table 3 presents the results of regression analyses and, in fact, it suggests that some of the insights provided by the correlation analyses do need to be reconsidered. Thus, for instance, when all other variables are controlled, voters were more likely to vote for the Democratic candidate in both the 2016 and the 2012 elections if religion was important to them (beta for 2016 = $-.09$, for 2012 = $-.12$).

Crucially, though, the regression analyses continue to provide solid support for the cultural backlash hypotheses, while they provide more ambiguous support for the cultural lag hypotheses. Thus, the 2016 betas for BLACKS, IMMIGRANTS, GAYS, and WOMEN (.17, .12, .06 and .16, respectively) are all stronger than their counterparts in 2012 (.15, .08, .00, and .08, respectively) and statistically significant. Trump voters seem to have been unusually unsympathetic to the condition of blacks, undocumented immigrants, gays and lesbians, and women.

On the other hand, support for the cultural lag hypotheses is less strong in the regression analyses than it appeared to be in the correlation analyses. None of the betas for INCOME, STOCKS, and EDUCATION (.00, $-.01$, and $-.02$, respectively) is statistically significant, and only the one for INCOME suggests much more relative economic deprivation among Trump voters than its counterpart (beta = $.05$) for the 2012 election. The beta for ECONOMY (.20) in the 2016 election strongly suggests that Trump voters felt more disappointment over the economy's performance than Clinton voters did, but it also suggests less relative disappointment than its counterpart (beta = $.30$) does for Romney voters, compared to Obama voters, in the 2012 election.

(See Table 3.)

DISCUSSION

We find evidence that voting for Trump in the 2016 election may have been substantially motivated by sentiments resulting from economic and technological changes that have gotten ahead of American society's ability to adapt—i.e., from cultural lag. We argue that the long-term disruption of the job market for the working class, especially the white working class, has left a considerable portion of the American electorate with a sense of malaise. Moreover, our state-level analysis suggests that this malaise, this feeling of ill being, was a strong correlate of Trump's margins.

Our individual-level analyses suggest support for the notion that Trump's success had more to do with resentments that may have been fostered by economic disruption than by lingering economic disadvantages themselves. In terms of income and stockholdings, for instance, Trump voters were *not* different from Clinton voters, although their relative economic disadvantage, compared to Romney voters in 2012, is notable. Relatively speaking, they were slightly less educated than Romney voters, but not significantly less educated than Clinton voters, when other variables in our analysis were controlled. They were much more likely than Clinton voters to see the economy as worse off than it was the previous year, but, compared to Romney voters in 2012, they were not quite as adamant on this point.

We want to point to limitations of our study, however, that make suspect its apparent negligible to weak support for the view that Trump supporters have been more disadvantaged by economic upheaval than Clinton supporters. First, and perhaps most important, we have no data about the *past* workplace experiences of voters in the 2016. We cannot say, as a result, what kind of dislocations voters may have experienced during the Great Recession of 2008/2009, or over the past forty or fifty years—and, hence, how these dislocations may have been related to their vote in the 2016 Presidential election. Second, we do not have access to data about whether voters were unemployed or non-participants in the labor force—both better indicators of *current* economic insecurity than any measures we were able to employ. Third, our finding of little difference between Trump and Clinton voters in terms of income, wealth and education is actually fairly striking, given the

Table 2. Correlates of Trump and Romney Votes

	Trump/Clinton 2016	Romney/Obama 2012
REPUBLICAN	.61***	.64***
WHITE	.33***	.34***
GENDER	-.06**	-.07***
AGE	.13***	.11***
RELIGION	.26***	.11***
INCOME	.01	.14***
STOCKS	-.07***	.00
EDUCATION	-.12***	-.16***
ECONOMY	.48***	.58***
BLACKS	.54***	.47***
IMMIGRANTS	.44***	.28***
GAYS	.30***	.25***
WOMEN	.49***	.35***

Notes: Number of valid cases for 2016 = 2,224, for 2012 = 1,860. An * indicates significance at the .05 level; A ** indicates significance at the .01 level; A *** indicates significance at the .001 level. Coding: REPUBLICAN: 1=Republican; 0 = not Republican; WHITE: 1 = white; 0 = non-white; GENDER: 1= female ; 0=male; RELIGION: 1= religion important; 0 = religion unimportant; STOCKS: 1= owns stocks; 0 = owns no stocks; ECONOMY: higher value indicates greater feeling that economy is very bad; BLACKS: higher value indicates greater disagreement with statement “Blacks have gotten less than they deserve”; IMMIGRANTS: higher value indicates more agreement with feelings that unauthorized immigrants are felons and should be deported; GAYS: higher values indicates more disagreement with feeling that gays and lesbians should not be discriminated against on the job; WOMEN: higher values indicate greater agreement with feeling that media should pay less attention to discrimination against women.

Table 3. Regression of Trump and Romney Votes on Other Variables

	Standardized Regression Coefficients (Betas)	
	Trump/Clinton 2016	Romney/Obama 2012
REPUBLICAN	.33***	.35***
WHITE	.14***	.16***
GENDER	-.02	-.03
AGE	.03*	.02
RELIGION	-.09***	-.12***
INCOME	.00	.05**
STOCKS	-.01	-.04*
EDUCATION	-.02	.01
ECONOMY	.20***	.30***
BLACKS	.17***	.15***
IMMIGRANTS	.12***	.08***
GAYS	.06***	.00
WOMEN	.16***	.08***
N	2211	1844
Adjusted R-square	.61	.61

Notes: Number of valid cases for 2016 = 2,224, for 2012 = 1,860. An * indicates significance at the .05 level; A ** indicates significance at the .01 level; A *** indicates significance at the .001 level. Coding: REPUBLICAN: 1= Republican; 0 = not Republican; WHITE: 1 = white; 0 = non-white; GENDER: 1= female ; 0 = male; RELIGION: 1 = religion important; 0 = religion unimportant; STOCKS: 1= owns stocks; 0 = owns no stocks; ECONOMY: higher value indicates greater feeling that economy is very bad; BLACKS: higher value indicates greater disagreement with statement “Blacks have gotten less than they deserve”; IMMIGRANTS: higher value indicates more agreement with feelings that unauthorized immigrants are felons and should be deported; GAYS: higher values indicates more disagreement with feeling that gays and lesbians should not be discriminated against on the job; WOMEN: higher values indicate greater agreement with feeling that media should pay less attention to discrimination against women.

historic tendency of Republicans to be richer and better educated than Democrats. It may actually mean that more of the poorer and less-educated voters voted for Trump than typically vote for Republican candidates. Nonetheless, to the extent that our indicators do tap the current economic conditions of voters, we can say that we were unable to turn up much evidence that those conditions did much to distinguish Trump from Clinton voters.

What we did find considerable evidence for is the view that Trump voters were more likely to express resentments, conceivably resulting from past economic challenges, about various minority and/or marginalized groups than Clinton voters. This has been true of supporters of previous Republican candidates, compared to those of their Democratic opponents, as our data on the 2012 election affirm. But the differences between the 2016 and 2012 elections suggest that Trump voters were unusually likely to have negative attitudes towards blacks, immigrants, gays and lesbians, and women, even compared to Republican-candidate supporters in previous elections. While we cannot say for sure that it was only white voters for Trump who had these attitudes, the results do constitute support for Arlie Hochschild's (2016) general contention that Trump voters felt resentment towards groups that made them feel like "strangers in their own land."

CONCLUSION

In general, using the cultural lag perspective, we find relatively little support for the contention that Trump voters were distinguished from Clinton voters in terms of their economic or educational levels. We find more support for the conclusion, also derived from the cultural lag perspective, that they were distinguished by a relatively bleak view of the economy. However, we were surprised to see that their bleak view of the economy did less to distinguish them from Clinton voters than it did to distinguish Romney from Obama voters in the 2012 election. Future research, however, might examine the question of whether Trump voters have experienced more economic and/or educational deprivation sometime in their past than Clinton voters. Such research might provide a truer test of the cultural lag perspective than we were able to achieve in our analysis, limited as we were to measures of voters' current economic and educational situations.

We find more evidence for hypotheses based upon the cultural backlash perspective. Trump voters expressed greater resentments about blacks, immigrants, women and gays and lesbians than did Clinton voters and these differences were considerably greater than similar ones that distinguished voters in the 2012 presidential election. Unfortunately, the data we analyzed cannot help us discern whether these resentments would have been detectable before the Trump candidacy or whether the Trump candidacy was a necessary condition for such resentments becoming notable and noted.

LITERATURE CITED

- Friedman, Thomas. 2016. *Thank You for Being Late: An Optimist's Guide in the Age of Accelerations*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Girous.
- Gallup. 2017. State of the States. Retrieved June 2, 2017. (<http://www.gallup.com/poll/125066/state-states.aspx>)
- Hochschild, Arlie, 2016. *Strangers in Their Own Land*. New York: The New Press.
- Inglehart, Ronald. 1997. *The Silent Revolution*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, Ronald & Norris, Pippa. 2016. "Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and the Cultural Backlash." Faculty Research Working Paper Series. Harvard Kennedy School: 1-52.
- Kenschaft, Lori, Clark, Roger & Ciambone, Desiree. 2016. *Gender Inequality in Our Changing World*. New York: Routledge.
- Monnat, Shannon. 2016. *Deaths of Despair and Support for Trump in the 2016 Presidential Election*. The Pennsylvania State University Department of Agricultural Economics, Sociology, and Education Research Brief. Retrieved June 3, 2017. (<http://aese.psu.edu/directory/smm67/Election16.pdf>)
- Murray, Charles. 2012. *Coming Apart: The State of White America, 1960-2010*. Crown Forum.
- Putman, Robert. 2015. *Our Kids: The American Dream in Crisis*. New York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks.

Ogburn, William. 1922. *Social Change with Respect to Culture and Original Nature*. New York: B. W. Huebsch.

Reeves, Richard. 2015. "The Dangerous Separation of the American Upper Middle Class." A Brookings Social Mobility Paper. Retrieved June 2, 2015. (<https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-dangerous-separation-of-the-american-upper-middle-class/>)

University of California, Berkeley. 2017. "SDA: Survey Documentation and Analysis." Retrieved June 3, 2017. (<https://sda.berkeley.edu/archive.htm>)

Wasserman, Davis. *Cook Political Report*. 2016 Popular Vote Tracker. Retrieved June 3, 2017. (<http://cookpolitical.com/story/10174>)

About the Authors: **Katherine Rocha** is a junior at Rhode Island College double majoring in Criminal Justice and Sociology. She plans to pursue a career in law enforcement. **Chris Sabetta** is a fifth-year Justice Studies major at Rhode Island College (RIC), planning to enroll in RIC's Masters in Justice Studies program next year. He plans to go into law enforcement, specializing in forensics. **Roger Clark** is Professor of Sociology at Rhode Island College, where he teaches research methods and the sociology of gender.