An Overview

Richard Rorty is one of the most provocative and influential of contemporary thinkers writing in English. As the journalist of ideas L. S. Klepp has put it, in an article entitled “Every Man a Philosopher-King,”

After winning a solid reputation with densely argued articles devoted to minute technical points in language -- in the conventional fashion of academic philosophy, [he] has spent the last 20 years turning himself into a philosophical maverick, a thorn in the academic establishment’s side or, to borrow Socrates’ job description, a gadfly.¹

In the process, Rorty went through divorce and remarriage (both his first wife Amélie and his second wife Mary are professional philosophers).² He also experienced a period of personal and professional depression, and shed his institutional affiliation with philosophy. Since 1983 he has been University Professor of Humanities at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville.

At least some of Rorty’s fellow professional philosophers have responded favorably to his probing: he has been honored with an anthology devoted to critical studies of his work (RR)³ and he is given the last word in Konstantin Kolenda’s handy history of philosophy, ⁴ as well as in a series of video-taped lectures on the Western intellectual tradition produced in cooperation with the Smithsonian Institution Resident Associate Program.⁵ He was President of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1979; his article “Pragmatism, Relativism, and Irrationalism” (CP ch. 9) was the presidential address to Eastern Division that year. But he made some enemies within the APA by voting for an anti-analytic candidate in a bitterly contested election. He has also received the prestigious and remunerative Macarthur (“genius”) Fellowship (CIS xi). His book Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature has been translated into six languages.⁶
There have been three book-length expositions of his thought. One of these, by Kolenda, is almost sycophantic\textsuperscript{vii} or as a somewhat more sympathetic critic has put it, “almost completely lacking in critical bite.”\textsuperscript{viii} Another, by C.G. Prado, is only moderately critical.\textsuperscript{ix} The third, by David L. Hall, treats Rorty more as a poet and a prophet than as a philosopher; it attempts a “Rortyan reading of Rorty,” including an occasional “strong misreading of his work.”\textsuperscript{x}

Rorty’s political background is solidly left liberal. His father, James Rorty, having been active in Communist-front organizations, left them in 1933 to work with Sidney Hook in the anti-Stalinist, Trotskyite left. (Hook was later to become Rorty’s first philosophical mentor, and remains one of his heroes [TT 576 n.10].) His maternal grandfather, Walter Rauschenbusch, was an eminent liberal Protestant theologian and proponent of the Social Gospel.

Rorty identifies himself politically sometimes as a (wet) liberal (PRM 451ff.), sometimes as a social democrat (TT 564) and sometimes as an (old-fashioned) cold war liberal (TT 576n.11, 578n.25). He expresses rather comic horror at the possibility of being considered a neoconservative (TT 565, 575n.5), though his political credo is as closely tied to the Cold War as is that of any writer for \textit{Commentary} or \textit{Encounter} (TT 565-7) -- and subject to obsolescence for exactly that reason. He defines his political ideal as “a future for the human race in which Enlightenment liberalism is carried through to its limit; eradicating in the process the last traces of Enlightenment radicalism” (TT 371). We shall see in what follows what becomes of the belief in the rational intelligibility of history that sustained the Marxist (and semi-Marxist) Left, and the belief in a providential order that sustained liberal Protestant (and other religiously motivated) social reformers.

A critic of Rorty might discuss his impact on politics, literature, religion, or morals. I here focus on his impact on education for several reasons. The question -- what sorts of people the next
generation of human beings is going to be -- is of great concern to all citizens. The low estate of the philosophy of education among professional philosophers means that those mainstream philosophers who address the educational scene are likely to exert a disproportionate influence there. And there is abundant reason to believe that education at all levels, quite independently of anything Rorty or I might say, is in both theoretical and practical crisis.\textsuperscript{xii} There can be no question, in this sort of situation, of philosophy leaving everything as it is.

In short, ideas at least sometimes have consequences, and ideas such as Rorty’s seem especially likely to do so. But, as Klepp puts it, “in the current fogbound cultural climate, his lucid, unassuming prose may work against him.”\textsuperscript{xii}

Rorty’s influence among educators, particularly those interested in reforming curriculum and educational practices in the ill-defined directions associated with the cultural Left, has been enormous.\textsuperscript{xiii} (I use the term \textit{cultural Left} only for want of a better. As Irving Howe has pointed out,\textsuperscript{xiv} the Marxist and social democratic traditions have never denounced inherited high culture, but have rather attempted to share its products with a wider audience.) René Acrilla\textsuperscript{xv} takes his work as defining the situation in which contemporary philosophers of education must work. John Willinsky cites Rorty (along with Salman Rushdie), as showing how “the postmodern mix of feminism, new historicism, deconstruction, and poststructuralism has the potential to expand the English curriculum until it spills happily over into other subject areas in a flow of cultural studies.”\textsuperscript{xvi} Carol Nicholson uses Rorty’s thought to advance a “rainbow coalition of postmodernists, feminists, and educators who are committed to the task of making sure that no serious voices are left out of the great conversation that shapes our curriculum and our civilization.”\textsuperscript{xvii} C. A. Bowers and David J. Flinders invoke his ideas against “Cartesian” ways of thinking about education, including the belief that “nonattendance ... can be objectively represented
Cleo H. Cherryholmes hails him as an apostle of something called “critical pragmatism,” whose only well-defined feature is that it does not take the purposes of existing society as givens. The best Cherryholmes does, by way of defining critical pragmatism is to contrast it with vulgar pragmatism or “pragmatism based on unreflective acceptance of explicit and implicit standards, conventions, rules, and discourses practices that we find around us” (p. 151).

Rorty’s influence is due in part to his virtues. One of these is his ability to identify themes, tendencies, problems, and crises common to such apparently disparate thinkers as Dewey, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein -- writers to whom he frequently professes allegiance. Thus he is able to write, with some show of authority, “James and Dewey were not only waiting at the end of the dialectical road which analytical philosophy traveled, but are waiting at the end of the road which, for example, Foucault and Deleuze are currently traveling” (CP xvii). To combine the analytical and dialectical skill characteristic of the Anglo-American tradition with a Continental sensitivity to the spiritual malaise that underlies our theoretical and practical problems, and on that basis frame proposals about the past, present, and future course of philosophy, would be a major achievement.

A second virtue is Rorty’s willingness to bring to the surface the methodological crisis of contemporary philosophy. The Western rationalistic tradition is under attack from ideologues on the one side and apolitical aesthetes on the other. And sometimes these two radically disparate forces have entered into an opportunistic alliance.

For my part, I understand this crisis as follows. The logical positivists have attempted to safeguard rational discourse by limiting it to the exact sciences. Thus they leave religion, politics, and morals -- and education -- to the purveyors of myth. Moreover, Carnap at least ended up treating logic, and hence also philosophy, as a matter of choice or convention -- propelled by “values” concerning which no reasoning was possible. Hence those who would reconstruct logic and language to meet
some political program, or turn philosophy into a form of sophisticated intellectual play, can find ample warrant in Carnap’s philosophy.

The side of the analytic tradition associated with the later Wittgenstein avoids attempting to force our language into a pre-established mold. Our language, it insists, is as complicated as our life. Wittgenstein has memorably expressed the resulting picture of language. “Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions made from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses.”xxi By language is here meant not words and sentences alone, but an array of symbolic activities (or what are sometimes called “discourses”). And our city includes not only the stable elements Wittgenstein mentions, but also zones of conflict and burnt-out districts not yet rebuilt.

Rorty’s argument begins with an attack on philosophy’s preoccupation with epistemology (theory of knowledge) and the attempt to model philosophy on natural science. Philosophers in the foundationalist tradition have looked to the theory of knowledge for a method that would solve or dissolve all problems.

Rorty sees foundationalism and the view that truth is correspondence with extra-mental reality as inextricably joined. Both are linked, in his view, with a picture of the human Mind as “our Glassy Essence” (PMN 42-5) -- superior to, and in hopeless tension with, our bodily nature. In his view they are both part of a picture, inherited from the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, for which “‘the Mind’ [is] a separate entity in which ‘processes’ can occur” (PMN 4) and philosophy is foundational for other disciplines because it judges to what extent these processes adequately represent extra mental reality (PMN 3-5).
Rorty rejects foundationalism in favor of holism: both meaning and truth, he concludes, are only possible within a system -- though not in Rorty’s case a philosophical system. Our language makes sense only as a set of activities each of whose elements is connected, at least in a rough sort of way, with the others. But he goes further and questions the centrality of beliefs in the usual sense: “It is pictures,” he urges, “metaphors rather than statements, which determine most of our philosophical convictions” (PMN 12). The correspondence theory of truth he rejects in favor of a form of pragmatism, whose precise character I shall discuss below.

Rorty supports his rejection of foundationalism and the correspondence theory of truth with an appeal to the writings of Thomas Kuhn (understood in their most radical sense). Kolenda summarizes the relevant aspects of Kuhn’s work, at least as many contemporary readers understand them:

Science did not adhere to its professed ideals in getting to where it is today. The course scientific development actually took reveals many paradigm shifts; much deviant, oddball experimentation; and often just sheer luck, the play of contingencies exploited by ingenious minds.\(^{xxii}\)

In the light of all this, Rorty endorses what he, perhaps unfortunately, calls “edifying” philosophy -- the “project of finding new, better, more interesting, more fruitful ways of speaking” (PMN 360). Or, as he puts it in another place, “All of us -- Derrideans and pragmatists alike -- should try to work ourselves out of our jobs by conscientiously blurring the literature-philosophy distinction and promoting the idea of a seamless, undifferentiated ‘general text’” (PP 2:86-7).

Edifying philosophy in this sense abandons systematic reasoning in favor of a kind of muddling through problems that draws on whatever resources our cultural heritage (or “form of
life”) makes available. Its central feature is proposals to replace one set of pictures of us and our world with another.

In a closely related line of thought, Rorty proposes the replacement of epistemology with hermeneutics, or (as one commentator puts it) “the study of various different ways of looking at and approaching the world, together with the attempt to interpret one way to another and to see what they or their derivatives and combinations have to offer” (Heal, RR 103). The hermeneutic philosopher is for Rorty “the informed dilettante, the polypragmatic Socratic intermediary between various discourses. In his salon, so to speak, hermetic thinkers are charmed out of their self-enclosed practices” (PMN 317). “Hermeneutics,” he insists, “is not ‘another way of knowing’ [but] another way of coping” (PMN 356) (Rorty never explains what exactly he means by coping. Kolenda defines the expression as follows: “To cope is to move through the world knowingly and effectively; it is to be on the lookout for how it might be changed for the better.” On the face of it, this definition requires a realist understanding of both truth and value.)

In addition to Rorty’s professions of allegiance to Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Dewey, we can discern the more direct influence of two contemporary professional philosophers: Donald Davidson and Wilfrid Sellars. From Davidson he takes two ideas: first, that “truth” is a primitive term, not definable as, for example, correspondence to external reality; and, second, that questions of interpretation (in Rorty’s language, “hermeneutics”) are philosophically central. From Sellars he takes the concept of we-intentions as undergirding morality and human interactions. From these premises he argues, first, that the mind-body problem can be dismissed as unreal, but that the materialism that results from this dismissal is no threat to ethics.

To the question, whether a culture that rejects even the problems of the Seventeenth (or for that matter of the Thirteenth) Century, if possible, is desirable, Rorty can only reply:
There is no way in which the dispute between the pragmatist and his opponent can be tightened up and resolved according to criteria agreed to by both sides. This is one of these issues that puts everything up for grabs at once -- where there is no point trying to find agreement with “the data” or agreement about what would count as settling the question. But the messiness of the issue is not a reason for setting it aside. The issue between religion and secularism was no less messy, but it was important that it got settled as it did. (CP xliii) At no stage does Rorty concentrate on producing good arguments. In his philosophy, there is not “much occasion to use the distinctions between logic and rhetoric, or between philosophy and literature, or between rational and nonrational methods of changing people’s minds” (CIS 83).

And he writes of Descartes:

[He] allowed ... much of the work of changing the notion of “Mind” to be done under the table, not by any explicit argument.... Such unconscious sleight of hand, when practiced by men of Descartes’ boldness of imagination, is an occasion for gratitude rather than censure. ... No intellectual revolution could succeed without it. (PMN 58 and n.28)

And of his own masters:

Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Dewey ... do not devote themselves to discovering false propositions or bad arguments in the works of their predecessors (though they occasionally do that too). Rather, they glimpse the possibility of a form of intellectual life in which the vocabulary of philosophical reflection inherited from the seventeenth century would seem as pointless as the thirteenth-century philosophical vocabulary seemed to the Enlightenment. (PMN 6)

In practice Rorty advises us, at crucial points in the philosophical debate, “to abandon argument and fall back on sarcasm” (PMN 122). Or, at best, “all we can do is be hermeneutic about the
opposition -- trying to show how the odd or paradoxical or offensive things they say hang together with the rest of the things they say, and how what they say looks when put in our own alternative idiom” (PMN 365).

And philosophical argument as Rorty understands it includes imputing bad motives to one’s opponents. Thus he writes, “one reason why professional philosophers recoil from the claim that knowledge may not have foundations, or rights and duties an ontological ground, is that the kind of behaviorism which dispenses with foundations goes a fair way toward dispensing with philosophy” (PMN 179).

The title of one of Rorty’s books, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, sums up the ways his sort of philosophy differs from its rationalistic and foundationalist forebears. By contingency Rorty does not mean only that important facts about ourselves (that we are a two-sexed species for example) do not obtain in all possible worlds. He means that we should abandon the search for the nature or essence of persons, community, or language (or indeed of anything else), and admit that it is “just a happenstance of our cultural development” (PMN 83) that we, for example, view ourselves as having subjective states such as pains and not just neural stimulations. He urges that we “try to get to the point where we no longer worship anything, where we treat nothing as a quasi divinity, where we treat everything -- our language, our conscience, our community -- as a product of time and chance” (CIS 22).

Instead of looking for the essence of humanity, Rorty argues, we should undertake the task of re-describing our world and ourselves “in more promising, indeed liberating, ways.” In short, he proposes to “substitute Freedom for Truth as the goal of thinking and social progress” (CIS xiii) -- but the value he places on freedom rests more on inherited allegiance (see the dedication to CIS) than on any argument.
Contingency in Rorty’s sense means that even our most central doctrines and concepts have at best a provisional validity. Hence he praises an ironic stance toward our “final vocabulary.” He explains this concept as follows:

All human beings carry about a set of words which they employ to justify their actions, their beliefs, and their lives.... They are words in which we tell, sometimes prospectively and sometimes retrospectively, the story of our lives. I shall call these words a person’s “final vocabulary.”

It is “final” in the sense that if doubt is cast on the worth of these words, their user has no noncircular argumentative recourse. ... A small part of the final vocabulary is made up of thin, flexible, and ubiquitous terms such as “true,” “good,” “right,” and “beautiful.” The larger part contains thicker, more rigid, and more parochial terms, for example “Christ,” “England,” “professional standards,” “decency,” “kindness,” “the Revolution,” “the Church,” “progressive,” “rigorous,” “creative.” The more parochial terms do most of the work. (CIS 73)

He argues that we should become the kind of people who suspect that our most pervasive concepts may not be quite right, or more precisely that it may be necessary to abandon them at any time. Thus he praises the ironist in the following terms:

(1) She has radical and continuing doubts about the final vocabulary she currently uses, because she has been impressed by other vocabularies, vocabularies taken as final by people or books she has encountered; (2) she realizes that argument phrased in her current vocabulary can neither underwrite nor resolve these doubts; (3) insofar as she philosophizes about her situation, she does not think that her vocabulary is closer to reality than others, that it is in touch with a power not herself. (CIS 73)
If there is any element in our outlook that can be safely held constant despite the radical contingency of both our concepts and our lives, it is an abhorrence of cruelty for which Rorty finds warrant in both Nabokov and Orwell (see CIS chs. 7 & 8).

Rorty calls the ironist’s opponent (and his own) the *metaphysician*:

Metaphysicians think that human beings by nature desire to know. They think this because the vocabulary they have inherited, their common sense, provides them with a picture of knowledge as a relation between human beings and “reality,” and the idea that we have a need and a duty to enter into this relation. It also tells us that “reality,” if properly asked, will help us determine what our final vocabulary should be. (CIS 75)

We in fact sometimes care about what happens to others, a feature of our situation Rorty calls *solidarity*. Rather than attempt to discover a pre-existent human nature to support our sense of solidarity, Rorty argues that we should attempt to further solidarity in practice.

We should stay on the lookout for marginalized people -- people whom we still instinctively think of as “they” rather than “us.” We should try to notice our similarities with them. ... [We should] *create* a more extensive sense of solidarity than we presently have. (CIS 196)

But the claims of solidarity are not based, at any point, in convictions about how things are.

In Rorty’s words,

The liberal ironist just wants *our chances of being kind*, of avoiding the humiliation of others, to be expanded by a redescription. She thinks that a common susceptibility to humiliation is the *only* social bond that is needed.... Her sense of human solidarity is based on a common danger, not on a common possession or a shared power (CIS 96).

Kolenda sums up Rorty’s philosophy as follows:
The three concepts -- contingency, irony, solidarity -- in Rorty’s use of them, are interconnected. Because freedom lies in the recognition of contingency, including the contingency of intellectual structures, ironism, as a persistent worry that our final vocabulary stands in need of improvement, is a sensible attitude to cultivate. ... A liberal ironist will always prefer persuasion to force, reform to revolution. And he will be on the lookout for the danger of humiliating others by rhetorical displays of one’s own intellectual or artistic powers. To think that the wish to be kind can be bolstered by argument, because to present one’s preferred alternative as having a rational foundation, or being lodged in some facts of “human nature” is to load the dice in one’s favor, thus opting to speak “from authority” -- a form of force.xxv

We face, at the outset of our examination of these ideas, a problem of styles of interpretation and methods of criticism. Hall believes that Rorty provides a serious challenge to the philosophical tradition, or at least to the philosophical establishment. In his own words,

Philosophers, habitually smug in their belief that their discipline is unassailable, are publicly affronted by Rorty’s attack on the integrity and the autonomy of the philosophical task, while many of them have begun to struggle privately with a vague feeling that the jig, in fact, is up.xxvi

But at the same time he concedes that Rorty “has a genius, abetted by some sophisticated rhetorical devices, for isolating his thinking from critical assault.”xxvii

The philosophical critic of Rorty’s thought has therefore two alternatives: to insist, nonetheless, on subjecting his ideas to scrutiny according to conventional rational standards (though not necessarily as interpreted by the most narrowly analytic philosophers), or to forsake the techniques of philosophical analysis and argument for those of literary criticism and ad hominem
argument. The first alternative risks charges of question begging; the second surrenders to Rorty things that perhaps ought not to be surrendered.

The construction of narratives has a somewhat ambiguous position. Rorty clearly makes much of them: he urges “finding a description of all the things characteristic of your time of which you most approve and with which you unflinchingly identify ... a description of the end toward which the historical developments which led up to your time were means” (CIS 55). And Hall describes him as “nominalist historicist,” one who “doesn’t argue by recourse to dialectical or historical tools. What he does, rather, is to tell a story, to construct a narrative in order to contextualize his claims about the way things are and the way things ought to be.”xxviii What this amounts to depends on the extent to which we see history as embodying a logical sequence, in which, for example, forms of life break down under their own internal contradictions. Without some such underlying rationale -- and it is hard to see how Rorty might be able to invoke it -- there is room for an indefinitely large number of narratives, both “progressive” and “reactionary,” as the interests, temperament, or mood of the writer may dictate.xxix

I here choose a conventional academic approach, supplemented by a political argument whose relevance Rorty, if he takes his self-definition as a pragmatist at all seriously, cannot deny. I shall argue that pragmatism, at least as interpreted by Rorty, has bad pragmatic effects: that its adoption is destructive of education at all levels, and that an educational system centered on a robust belief in Truth is by every standard preferable. And the political consequences of Rorty’s thought, although I shall be making less of this point in these pages, seem to me at least equally deplorable. (Hall (p. 52) cites as “the best defense of Rorty’s strategy” a statement of Miguel de Unamuno, that “the fact that the consequences of a statement are disastrous says nothing against the truth of the proposition.” On Unamuno’s metaphysical and epistemological premises this
response may make sense, but not on Rorty’s.) I shall also use narratives, but only as supplements to more conventional arguments. And I shall attempt to avoid misreading, strong or otherwise, of Rorty’s text. (Nor shall I be centrally concerned with whether Rorty misreads his predecessors, or, if he does so, this misreading is to be considered “weak” or “strong.”)

There are, in any case, deep reasons why a critique of Rorty cannot be as rigorously argued as some readers might desire. Rorty has endorsed the postmodern preference for “slimy concepts, rather than the rigorous axioms of logic.”xxx His arguments -- though he does occasionally offer rigorous conceptual analysis -- are for that reason often vague and rhetorical -- a trait he inherits from one of his mentors John Dewey. There is often no alternative to answering him in kind.

NOTES


ii Unless otherwise attributed, biographical information is taken from ibid., pp. 117-8.

iii This collection contains both a bibliography of Rorty’s writings through 1989 and suggestions for teaching his works. It focuses on PMN, and perhaps for that reason plays down Rorty’s nihilism.


vii Rorty’s Humanistic Pragmatism.


x Richard Rorty; quotations, pp. 10, 6.

xii “Every Man a Philosopher-King,” p. 24.

xiii See, in addition to the authors cited in the text, James W. Garrison, “Philosophy as (Vocational) Education,” *Educational Theory*, 40 (Summer, 1990), 399ff.


xvii “Postmodernism, Feminism, and Education,” *Educational Theory*, 39 (Summer, 1989), 204.


xxiii Philosophy's Journey, p. 359.

xxiii Rorty's Humanistic Pragmatism, p. 67.

xxiv Kolenda, Philosophy's Journey, p. 361

xxv Ibid., pp. 363-4.


xxvii Ibid., p. 4.

xxviii Ibid., p. 11.

xxix For a narrative well outside Rorty’s horizon, see John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1991).