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ALGERIA, DE GAULLE, AND THE BIRTH OF THE FRENCH FIFTH REPUBLIC

Daniel A. Gagnon

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In May, 1958, rebels supported by the French Army seized control of French Algeria and threatened to invade mainland France if their demands were not met, an event which ultimately led to the death of the French Fourth Republic. The rebellion in Algeria was planned in advance by French settlers with the eventual support of the Army, nearly led to a civil war in mainland France, and the only solution to this crisis was the intervention of General Charles de Gaulle. General de Gaulle retired from public life many years before, but in this crisis he returned to politics and became Prime Minister of France. The uprising highlighted the inherent weaknesses of the Fourth Republic, a system of government which was utterly unable to cope with this crisis. Not long after the uprising, the Fourth Republic was replaced with the Fifth Republic, a stronger and more stable system of government.

The rebellion in Algeria commenced on May 13, 1958, and its causes were both long-term and immediate. The long term causes began during, or soon after, the liberation of France in 1944. France and many of its overseas possessions were occupied by either the Germans or the Japanese during the war, and this shattered the illusion of French military might among the natives. The French Empire was in danger of disintegration, and barely remained intact. The Empire temporarily united once again after the victorious ending of the Second World War, but then the situation became increasingly untenable. The rebellion in Indochina, and then the eventual loss of this territory, made the Empire appear even more vulnerable, particularly after the humiliating defeat of the French Army at Diên Biên Phu in May, 1954. The war in Indochina was known as "*la sale guerre* (the dirty war)" because of how bloody it was, with tens of thousands of French soldiers killed. The government in Paris appeared increasingly impotent after this defeat, and between the years 1954 and 1958 the governments of five different Prime Ministers lost the confidence of the National Assembly and were replaced.

The loss of Indochina embarrassed a nation which was trying to restore its military honor after the miserable defeat in 1940, and the military vowed that they would never again allow disaster like the withdrawal from Indochina to occur. The French Army became hostile towards the government that they believed betrayed them by surrendering Indochina after so many men fought and died to preserve French control. The French Army felt betrayed once again by the government during the Suez Crisis of 1956. During this crisis, France, Britain, and Israel invaded Egypt ostensibly to secure the Suez Canal. Many battle-hardened regiments of the French Army, particularly the paratroopers, were sent from Algeria to the warzone in Egypt. The operation ended in a fiasco. France and Britain were forced to withdraw their troops under international pressure even though the French Army was very successful on the battlefield. The French Army once again felt that the government sent them into a conflict and sacrificed the lives of soldiers, only to change its mind and withdraw.

Along with the frustration in the Army, the native Algerians faced their own crisis. The fall of France in 1940 showed how the French Empire was not as strong as the natives assumed, and their respect for French administration weakened after they saw the powerful American and British armies liberate their country from the Axis powers. From this point on, many Muslim Algerian intellectuals sought greater political rights and autonomy from the Paris government. Algerians at this time witnessed Tunisia and Morocco leave the French Empire to become independent states, and they wished to do likewise. But this was problematic because unlike Indochina, Tunisia, and Morocco, which were colonies or protectorates, Algeria was legally an integral part of France proper, just like the mainland. Nonetheless, on November 1, 1954, the Algerian *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN) issued a proclamation announcing that they were seeking complete independence for Algeria. The proclamation expressed their desire for

negotiated independence, but declared that they would use all means necessary in order to separate from France. It states the FLN's goals as "the restoration of the Algerian state, sovereign, democratic, and social within the principles of Islam," and goes on to announce, "the struggle will be long, but the outcome is certain. To limit the bloodshed we propose an honorable platform for discussion with the French authorities."¹ The FLN committed itself to independence, and left the choice of either negotiations or war up to the French authorities. But France would not negotiate, which led to a long and bloody guerrilla war throughout Algeria.

Throughout this war in Algeria, the *colons*, French settlers in Algeria, were afraid that France would abandon them, as it abandoned the settlers in Indochina, Tunisia, and Morocco. There were over one million settlers in Algeria of European descent, and they feared what would happen to their position if the predominately-Muslim nation became independent.² The French Army fought viciously against the Algerian nationalists, and imposed harsh reprisals for terrorist attacks. This alienated the many moderate Muslims in Algeria, and increased the support for the insurgents among the native population.³ During the late 1950s there were roughly 400,000 troops stationed in Algeria, the majority of the French Army, many of whom were conscripts. This was the first time that France sent draftees to fight in a colonial war.⁴ By 1956, most of the regular officers in the Army had spent almost 20 years away from metropolitan France fighting in various colonial wars.⁵

¹ Front de Libération Nationale, "Proclamation du Front de Libération Nationale, 1 Novembre 1954," news release, accessed February 21, 2013, <http://historicaltextarchive.com/sections.php?action=read#artid=10>.

² Phillip M. Williams and Martin Harrison, *De Gaulle's Republic* (London: Longmans, 1965), 34.

³ *Ibid*, 36.

⁴ Williams and Harrison, *De Gaulle's Republic*, 38.

⁵ Dorothy Pickles, *Algeria and France: From Colonialism to Cooperation* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), 57.

Terror attacks in Algeria continued regardless of the surge of French troops, and the FLN bombed public places in Algiers frequented by Europeans, such as bus stops, malls, and dance clubs.⁶ This violence caused near-civil war conditions in Algeria, and began to affect mainland France as well. By 1956 there was an average of three Muslim against Muslim murders every day in mainland France, usually between those Muslims who supported the FLN and the Muslims who supported the government.⁷ Throughout France, frustration grew because the war seemed impossible to win.

The Army and French *colons* in Algeria became increasingly concerned that they were not given the means necessary to win the war, and feared that the government in Paris would resign itself to the loss of Algeria due to the high death toll. In December, 1956, the former Vichyite General Jacques Faure was caught plotting to seize power in Algeria to ensure that it remained French-controlled. However, he was not seriously punished by the civilian government and was instead transferred to a command in Germany.

In January, 1957, a bazooka round was fired into the office of the Commander-in-Chief of the French Army in Algeria, General Raoul Salan. It was suspected that ultra-nationalist anti-republican *colons* were behind this attack, because many *colons* believed that General Salan did not support their very conservative ideology. The *colons* in Algeria spread propaganda among the soldiers blaming the Republic for the problems of waging the war, and hoped to implant their right-wing ideology in the Army.⁸ Several Gaullist *colons* set up a Committee of Vigilance in Algiers to better organize themselves, and they hoped to bring about the return of General de

⁶ Ibid, 40.

⁷ Ibid, 39.

⁸ Raymond Aron, *France: Steadfast and Changing* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), 113.

Gaule to power.⁹ With the situation in Algeria deteriorating, the civil authorities in the city of Algiers gave the Army responsibility for keeping order. All police powers passed to the 10th Paratroop Division, commanded by General Jacques Massu. The resulting crackdown against the insurgents became known as the ‘Battle of Algiers.’ The paratroopers’ reign of terror in Algiers was brutal and in the first nine months of their rule 5,000 people were sent to prison or concentration camps, and roughly 3,000 people disappeared.¹⁰

In Algiers, the stage was set for a rebellion. The French Army increasingly gained power in Algeria and took over some functions from the civil authorities, all the while being influenced by the anti-republican *colons*. The real spark for the conflict came on May 8, 1958, when it became evident that Pierre Pflimlin would be the next Prime Minister of France. Pflimlin was widely seen as being in favor of negotiating with the Algerian insurgents. On May 10, the Gaullist Committee of Vigilance in Algiers sent a telegram to Pflimlin imploring him to step aside “to make room for a Government of Public Safety.”¹¹ The Committee next issued a proclamation to the citizens of Algiers calling for a general strike and demonstration for May 13, the day of Pflimlin’s investiture vote in the Nation Assembly, to “affirm the determination of Algeria to see the establishment of a Government of Public Safety.”¹² On the same day in Paris another civilian group, the Veterans Action Committee, also started planning a demonstration for May 13 to commemorate the execution of three French soldiers in Tunisia. These veterans would protest at the *Monument Aux Morts* in Algiers, as well as in Paris. The military leaders in Algeria

⁹ Orville D. Menard, *The Army and the Fifth Republic* (Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press, 1967), 105

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 44.

¹¹ Roy C. Macridis and Bernard Edward Brown, *The De Gaulle Republic: Quest for Unity* (Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press, 1960), 77.

¹² *Ibid.*

planned on attending the veterans' ceremony. In addition, General Salan sent a letter to the President of the Republic, René Coty, warning him that the army might not remain loyal if a pro-surrender government was set up in Paris. The Chief of Staff of the French Army became aware of this letter and wrote to de Gaulle warning him of the impending conflict.¹³

On May 12, Pflimlin sent an envoy to Algiers to meet with high-ranking generals and to show them a copy of the investiture speech he would be delivering the next day at the National Assembly. In the speech, Pflimlin kept open the possibility of negotiating with the Algerian insurgents. General Salan told the envoy, "the intentions of the future premier in regard to Algeria are impossible to accept here. I add that the only guarantor of French Algeria is General de Gaulle."¹⁴ The generals said they would be unwilling to sacrifice further French lives if the ultimate result was to be a French withdrawal from Algeria. General Salan added, "in order to avoid disorder, I suggest that M. Pflimlin withdraw" his candidacy for Prime Minister.¹⁵

Pflimlin, however, went ahead as planned with his speech and investiture vote the next day, May 13.

The *colons* and the French Army could not accept a pro-surrender government in Paris, and the demonstration on May 13 was allowed to go ahead. This protest was entirely organized by civilians in Algeria, and represented the popular views of French Algerians. A few days before the demonstration, the editor of the popular newspaper *Echo d'Alger* wrote, "if Pflimlin is invested, we are lost."¹⁶ This quote from a major newspaper demonstrates that it was not just a

¹³ Ibid, 75.

¹⁴ Menard, *The Army and the Fifth*, 109.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Macridis and Brown, *The De Gaulle Republic*, 77.

small minority of the *colons* who were alarmed by Pflimlin's impending investiture, but rather that it was a widespread view.

The general strike in Algiers took place as scheduled at midday on May 13, with the stoppage of transportation, and the closure of schools, universities, cafés, cinemas, and government offices.¹⁷ Throughout the demonstration, the Committee of Vigilance distributed leaflets claiming that the government in Paris was going to negotiate with the FLN insurgents and abandon the French *colons*. There were also speeches against many prominent Paris politicians. The day of protest culminated with the veterans' ceremony at the *Monument Aux Morts*, in honor of the three dead French soldiers, which over 100,000 people attended.¹⁸ The leading French generals in Algeria arrived and laid wreaths at the monument. In the crowd there were shouts that the Army should take power.¹⁹ The Generals left, and the demonstration continued to grow in fervor. A small group of protesters led by young *lycéens* and university students marched on the General Government building, the seat of French administration in Algeria. The building was defended by the civilian CRS riot police, a division of the French National Police. The riot police used tear gas on the protesters which further enraged the crowd, and many more demonstrators joined the students from the square at the *Monument Aux Morts*. The riot police fell back behind the gates of the building leaving the Forum, the square in front of the building, open to protesters. The crowd began smashing the cars of government officials outside the building as paratroopers arrived to reinforce the police. The riot police fired more tear gas and then about half a dozen shots. However, the paratroopers did nothing to stop the crowd

¹⁷ Gaffney, *Political Leadership in France*, 11.

¹⁸ Menard, *The Army and the Fifth*, 111.

¹⁹ Gaffney, *Political Leadership in France*, 12.

and at around 6:45 pm about 500 demonstrators charged forward using the paratroopers' army truck as a battering ram and broke into the building.²⁰

Once the building was breached, youths began throwing government papers out the windows, although the paratroopers prevented the demonstrators from getting to the police files. Interestingly enough, several military and police files, including the ones about the bazooka attack on General Salan, conveniently disappeared in the confusion.²¹ One of the paratroop officers later said of the demonstration, "no casualties, fortunately, except the Republic, and that's not serious."²² This quote and the actions of the paratroopers during this uprising prove that although the soldiers were not the ones who planned the revolution, they agreed with its principles and were willing to let it continue. A Committee of Public Safety made up of ultra-nationalists was formed later that night with General Massu at its head, which only led to increased speculation in Paris about the Army's role in the uprising. Massu later claimed that he accepted the lead position on the Committee merely in order to try and control the uprising, but as the movement continued he would become complicit in its actions.

In Paris, the investiture of Pflimlin went ahead and the deputies in the Assembly refused to bow to the demands of the protesters. Pflimlin received the support of the socialist and centrist deputies, but was opposed by the right along with abstentions by the Communists.²³ Pflimlin, in agreement with the outgoing Prime Minister, agreed to give General Salan full civil powers in Algeria to restore order. Immediately after his investiture, Pflimlin presided over a meeting of the Council of Ministers which made several decisions in order to defend the Republic. They cut all

²⁰ Phillip M. Williams and Martin Harrison, *De Gaulle's Republic* (London: Longmans, 1965), 52-54.

²¹ *Ibid*, 55.

²² *Ibid*.

²³ Macridis and Brown, *The De Gaulle Republic*, 84.

communications between metropolitan France and Algeria, prohibited all airplane flights between the two, and stopped all payments from the Ministry of Finance to Algeria. President Coty issued a statement as Commander-in-Chief that implored the Army to obey the civilian government. The Prime Minister proceeded to call General Salan, and promised him that he would never abandon Algeria. General Salan, exercising the powers recently given to him by Paris, ordered all Algerians to stop the strike and return to work, but the Committee of Public Safety ordered the strike to continue and asked General de Gaulle to step in to ensure that Algeria would remain French.²⁴ On May 15 Salan gave a speech from the balcony of the General Government building to the demonstrators gathered on the Forum, and ended his speech with the cry “*Vive l’Algérie Française! Et Vive de Gaulle!*”²⁵ This mention of de Gaulle thrilled the crowd in Algiers, and in France de Gaulle responded saying he was “ready to assume the powers of the Republic.”²⁶ This response by de Gaulle gave strength to the rebels, and it legitimized their uprising in the eyes of many in France. The invocation of de Gaulle’s name by General Salan in Algiers showed the politicians in Paris once and for all which side the Army would take in the standoff between the *colons* in Algiers and the government in Paris.

France was now divided in half with the mainland and Corsica controlled by the civilian government, and Algeria controlled by the *colons* and the military. The government in Paris feared a civil war would break out, similar to the Spanish Civil War of 1936-39. The rebels in Algeria had a much stronger position, however, because the overwhelming majority of the French Army was in Algeria and they supported the rebellion. The government in Paris was also

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Williams and Harrison, *De Gaulle's Republic*, 59.

²⁶ Charles de Gaulle, "Déclaration du 15 mai 1958," news release, accessed February 20, 2013, <http://www.charles-de-gaulle.org/pages/espace-pedagogique/le-point-sur/les-textes-a-connaître/declaration-du-15-mai-1958.php>.

hesitant to trust military units stationed on the mainland, fearing that they might join their fellow soldiers in revolt. Meanwhile, most major cities in Algeria established their own Committees of Public Safety which further separated them from the Paris government. Some *colons* began to compare this uprising with the Revolution of 1789.²⁷

Meanwhile, de Gaulle negotiated with the government in Paris to become the next Prime Minister. However, de Gaulle would only accept becoming the next Prime Minister if he was given powers to amend the constitution. The government refused, and claimed that his request was illegal. This rejection by the civil authorities only succeeded in making de Gaulle even more popular among the rebels and soldiers in Algeria.²⁸ In response to this, General Massu in Algiers prepared a plan called “Operation Corse” under which the rebel paratroopers would invade the island of Corsica and bring the uprising one step closer to Paris.

At 5:15 am on May 24, the Algerians sent an envoy to Corsica who persuaded the island to change over to the rebels’ side under threat of invasion. The island capitulated without any bloodshed, and soon rebel paratroopers began to arrive. The government in Paris scrambled to respond, always fearing that the mainland military would join the rebellion. The government planned an invasion to retake Corsica, but abandoned the idea because the French Navy was reluctant to fight against fellow Frenchmen.²⁹ Additionally, the French Air Force, in defiance of the blockade of Algeria, sent transport aircraft to Algiers to be used in a future invasion of the mainland.³⁰ The national police forces in France were also suspected of supporting the military,

²⁷ Williams and Harrison, *De Gaulle's Republic*, 63.

²⁸ *Ibid*, 64.

²⁹ *Ibid*, 67.

³⁰ *Ibid*.

in which case the government had no forces left to defend the Republic. At this point the Cabinet realized that their power was slipping and that civil war was approaching.

Some members of the government negotiated with de Gaulle, while others planned for the worst. The Republic had its strongest support among the socialists and Communists, the groups that were anti-Gaullist. These groups feared that a military coup would result in a military dictatorship, as occurred after the Spanish Civil War. The Communists had large support among the miners unions in the north of France, and they threatened to resist a Gaullist takeover. In the case of an invasion of France by the rebels, socialist leader Guy Mollet announced that he would defend the Republic and “die on the barricades with the miners of the north” rather than submit to a military dictatorship.³¹

On the night of May 26 into early morning on May 27, de Gaulle met with members of the government. The government leaders demanded that de Gaulle make certain guarantees that he would not become a dictator after being invested with the unusual amount of power he requested. Unfortunately, no agreement was reached and the talks broke down. Pflimlin reported this lack of agreement to the members of the Assembly. But to their surprise, the next morning de Gaulle issued a statement saying that he was “in the process of establishing a republican government capable of assuring the unity and independence of the country.”³² Although surprising to the government, this announcement was of great importance. After his meeting with the government representatives, Charles de Gaulle learned that the rebels planned their invasion of the mainland, called “Operation Resurrection,” to take place the very next night. Fortunately,

³¹ Macridis and Brown, *The De Gaulle Republic*, 84.

³² Charles de Gaulle, "Communiqué de presse du 27 mai 1958," news release, accessed February 20, 2013, <http://www.charles-de-gaulle.org/pages/espace-pedagogique/le-point-sur/les-textes-a-connaître/communique-de-presse-du-27-mai-1958.php>.

his announcement that he was making progress in becoming the next leader of France caused the rebels to delay their planned invasion and gave de Gaulle more time to negotiate with the government.

During the early morning hours of May 28, the cabinet decided that the only option left to avoid war was to resign so that de Gaulle could be invested. Pflimlin wanted to avoid a power vacuum so he announced his conditional resignation, which would become effective once de Gaulle was elected as the next Prime Minister. That afternoon, 200,000 pro-Republic demonstrators marched to the Place de la République in Paris protesting against the rebels.³³ The demonstration consisted mainly of Communists, socialists, and members of the more moderate Radical Party. Soon afterwards, President René Coty received an ultimatum from Algiers stating that the invasion of metropolitan France would commence on May 30, and that the invasion would only be called off if de Gaulle was in power.³⁴ On the morning of May 29, President Coty announced that if de Gaulle was not invested by the Assembly he would resign rather than preside over the impending civil war. The President's message stated, "here we are now on the brink of civil war. After having fought the enemy for forty years, are Frenchmen tomorrow going to fight Frenchmen?"³⁵ The Assembly decided that electing de Gaulle as the next Prime Minister was truly the only way to save the Republic, and on June 1 the General appeared before the National Assembly. Charles de Gaulle won the vote of confidence with 329 votes in support, and 224 against.

³³ Macridis and Brown, *The De Gaulle Republic*, 93.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ Letter by René Coty, "Message du Président de la République René Coty au Parlement, 29 mai 1958," May 29, 1958.

After hearing of de Gaulle's impending investiture, the Army called off its invasion set for May 30. The rebels' demands were met, and their chosen man was now in power. On June 4, General de Gaulle flew to Algiers and delivered a speech to the crowds there. He began his speech to the rebels by saying, "I have understood you!" but ended it with "*Vive la République! Vive la France!*"³⁶ This speech is symbolic of how although it was the military rebels who succeeded bringing de Gaulle to power, in the end de Gaulle was legally invested as the leader of the Republic and was not a military dictator. De Gaulle's ascension to power ended the fears of a civil war, and during his term he redrafted the constitution and strengthened French democracy in the form of the Fifth French Republic, which remains today as the current government system in France.

³⁶ Charles de Gaulle, "Discours d'Alger, 4 juin 1958," speech presented in Algiers, Algeria, June 4, 1958, last modified 2013, accessed February 21, 2013, <http://www.charles-de-gaulle.org/pages/espace-pedagogique/le-point-sur/les-textes-a-connaître/discours-drsquoalger-4-juin-1958.php>.

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Aron, Raymond. *France: Steadfast and Changing*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960.

Primary source. Aron was one of the most prominent French intellectuals of the 20th century, and he served as a journalist and witness to the uprising in Algeria and the political change which followed. Although the English edition of the cited text was not published until 1960, the original French edition was published in 1959, soon after the institution of the new Fifth Republic. The original French title of this text is “*Immuable et changeante. De la IVe à la Ve République*” (*Steadfast and Changing: the Fourth to the Fifth Republic*) and the work describes the reasons behind the creation of the new Republic, including the role which the uprising played in changing French political thought.

Coty, René. Letter, "Message du Président de la République René Coty au Parlement, 29 mai 1958," May 29, 1958.

Primary source. This letter from the President of France to the French Parliament outlines the reasons for the compromise which averted a civil war. The President was able to convince the deputies to accept the army's demand of electing de Gaulle as Prime Minister, and so this letter is essential for a better understanding of what the Paris politicians thought of the Army uprising.

de Gaulle, Charles. "Communiqué de presse du 27 mai 1958." News release. Accessed February 20, 2013. <http://www.charles-de-gaulle.org/pages/espace-pedagogique/le-point-sur/les-textes-a-connaître/communiqué-de-presse-du-27-mai-1958.php>.

Primary Source. A press release from Charles de Gaulle, who was the central figure in the creation of the Fifth Republic. As mentioned previously in the text this message was responsible for delaying the army's planned invasion of France and preventing an armed struggle. It shows how de Gaulle was interested in the best interests of France and would not use the armed rebellion to seize power by force.

———. "Déclaration du 15 mai 1958." News release. Accessed February 20, 2013. <http://www.charles-de-gaulle.org/pages/espace-pedagogique/le-point-sur/les-textes-a-connaître/declaration-du-15-mai-1958.php>.

Primary source. This press release from de Gaulle was published very early in the uprising, and in it de Gaulle acknowledged the rebellion in Algeria and responded that he was willing to work with them. This was seen by many in France as an endorsement, and de Gaulle's fame lent credibility to the uprising.

———. "Discours d'Alger, 4 juin 1958." Speech presented in Algiers, Algeria, June 4, 1958. Last modified 2013. Accessed February 21, 2013. <http://www.charles-de-gaulle.org/pages/espace-pedagogique/le-point-sur/les-textes-a-connaître/discours-drsquoalger-4-juin-1958.php>.

Primary source. This source is important because it shows the results of the uprising and how de Gaulle reacted to it. It reinforces his loyalty to a republican form of government, while showing his support for the army which had risen against the republic. De Gaulle also speaks on the significance of the army's actions and how France will be improved because of the changes to the constitution which will be implemented.

Front de Libération Nationale. "Proclamation du Front de Libération Nationale, 1 Novembre 1954." News release. Accessed February 21, 2013. <http://historicaltextarchive.com/sections.php?action=read#artid=10>.

Primary source. This manifesto was published by the Algerian revolutionaries hoping to win Algerian independence. This text outlines the grievances of the native population and shows the causes for the war in Algeria and the large French military presence there. This is significant because the war in Algeria was the backdrop of the uprising by the French Army and settlers against the Republic.

Gaffney, John. *Political Leadership in France: From Charles De Gaulle to Nicholas Sarkozy*. Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

Secondary source. This work is a survey of the political lives of all the Presidents of the Fifth Republic, with de Gaulle being the first. The section I used was the early part of the book which describes the uprising in the city of Algiers in detail, while also explaining the ideological causes behind the army's political demands.

Macridis, Roy C., and Bernard Edward Brown. *The De Gaulle Republic: Quest for Unity*. Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press, 1960.

Secondary source. This text deals with the political issues in Paris before and during the uprising, and how de Gaulle stepped in and France was unified under his leadership. I rely on it most heavily for the section about Pflimlin being invested as Prime Minister in Paris while the uprising was occurring in Algiers. This text outlines how his government was not strong enough to weather the crisis, and only de Gaulle was capable of resolving the situation.

Menard, Orville D. *The Army and the Fifth Republic*. Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press, 1967.

Secondary source. Although a secondary source, this book is insightful because it was written very soon after the events in Algeria transpired. This text deals specifically with how the army was involved in the creation of the new Fifth Republic in France. The text

covers several events, the most important of which was this uprising in 1958, and also outlines what changes the Army sought to implement in French governance and society.

Pickles, Dorothy. *Algeria and France: From Colonialism to Cooperation*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963.

Secondary source. This text provides a background on the history of the native resistance to the French presence in Algeria, and how the French Army was involved in this conflict during the time that it was rebelling against the central government in Paris.

Williams, Phillip M., and Martin Harrison. *De Gaulle's Republic*. London: Longmans, 1965.

Secondary source. This text was most useful for its descriptions of the actions of the civilian "Committees of Public Safety" that appeared in many Algerian cities. These committees were run by the French settlers and sought to emulate the revolutionary governments of 1789. Overall gives a great overview of the ideology of the colonial settlers and their role that they played in the uprising.

Works Consulted/Recommended Further Reading

Assemblée nationale. "Gouvernements de la IVe République." Assemblée nationale. Accessed February 7, 2013. <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/histoire/gvt4rep.asp#pflimlin>.

Secondary source. This website, published by the French National Assembly lists all the Prime Ministers of the Fourth Republic, and the ministers which formed their governments. Of particular interest to this paper is the sections on the Pflimlin government of May 1958 and the de Gaulle government which immediately followed it on June 1st 1958.

Cogan, Charles. *Charles De Gaulle: A Brief Biography with Documents*. Boston: Bedford Books of St. Martin's Press, 1996.

Secondary source. This work gives an overview of de Gaulle's whole life, although for this paper the relevant section was his role in crisis in Algeria and his actions upon becoming Prime Minister, and eventually President under the new Republic. The text describes well how de Gaulle reacted to the uprising, and how he used it to mold the new Republic to his own vision.

De Gaulle, Charles. Speech presented in Constantine, Algeria, October 3, 1958. *Modern History Sourcebook*. Last modified July 1998. Accessed February 7, 2013. <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1958degaulle-algeria1.html>.

Primary Source. This speech given by de Gaulle several months after he became Prime Minister of France, and after the referendum on the new Fifth Republic occurred. The speech outlines the progress made under de Gaulle's leadership and his view for the new Republic, as well as what this means for the Algerians.

Kramer, Mark. "The Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises in Hungary and Poland: Reassessments and New Findings." *Journal of Contemporary History* 33, no. 2 (1998): 163-214.

Secondary source. This article deals primarily with Soviet actions in 1956, but it also describes the Anglo-French role in the Suez Crisis and the decision of the French and British to eventually withdraw from the canal under international pressure, which gave the impression to the French Army that they had fought in this engagement needlessly.

Mollet, Guy. *Bilan et Perspectives Socialiste*. Paris: Plon, 1958. Accessed February 7, 2013. <http://icp.ge.ch/po/cliotexte/xxe-siecle-colonisation-decolonisation-tiers-monde-civilisations-extra-europeennes/algerie.independance.html>.

Primary source. This excerpt from Guy Mollet, leader of the French socialists, outlines his party's position on the Algerian issue. As the main opponent of de Gaulle and the Army this is significant. This website as a whole also has many other facts and figures on the uprising in Algeria.

Planchais, Jean. *Le Malaise de l'Armée*. Paris: Plon, 1958. Accessed February 7, 2013. <http://icp.ge.ch/po/cliotexte/xxe-siecle-colonisation-decolonisation-tiers-monde-civilisations-extra-europeennes/algerie.independance.html>.

Primary source. Jean Planchais was a French journalist in Algeria, and in this excerpt of his work he describes the feelings and rationale behind the French Army's dislike of the government and the reasons for their revolt. Planchais wrote much on the war in Algeria and the Army's role in it in the late 1950's and early 1960's, so this text by him is an excellent source from someone who witnessed the events of the uprising.

Smith, Tony. *The French Stake in Algeria, 1945-1962*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978.

Secondary source. Provides excellent background on the history of the French Army in Algeria, and how the loss of other colonies led the Army to be ruthless in suppressing the natives, while also insubordinate to the government in Paris.

Talbott, John E. *The War Without a Name: France in Algeria, 1954-1962*. New York: Knopf, 1980.

Secondary source. This text is a general history of the Algerian struggle for independence. It describes the role of the French Army during the war in Algeria and other contemporary colonial wars such as in Indochina.

Thody, Philip. *The Fifth French Republic: Presidents, Politics and Personalities*. London: Routledge, 1998.

Secondary source. This text is a political history of the Fifth Republic, and includes a description of de Gaulle's assumption of power during the crisis.

Wahl, Nicholas. *The Fifth Republic: France's New Political System*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1979.

Secondary source. This is mainly a political more than a historical text. It describes the changes which de Gaulle implemented after he was instituted as the Prime Minister of France at the request of the army. It describes the changes made to the political system to create the Fifth Republic.