

The Gender Gap in Political Affiliation: Understanding Why It Emerged and Maintained Itself Over Time

By

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Abstract

In this paper we examine the gender gap in political affiliation that emerged during the 1980s and has remained ever since. In that decade, for the first time since American women obtained the right to vote in 1920, they showed a tendency to vote more Democratic than men. There have been two major explanations for this development: 1) that women's labor force participation increased dramatically during the 1970s and 2) that their chances of being unmarried did as well. We examine these explanations using General Social Survey data collected between 1972 and 2018. We also explore two explanations that involve changes in men's lives: 1) that men are (of course) also less likely to be married themselves than they were before 1970; and 2) that men have left unions in greater numbers than women. We speculate that these last two changes have led to men's greater likelihood of declaring themselves Republican. We find support for all four explanations.

Keywords: gender gap in political affiliation, marital decline, women's labor force participation, de-unionization

Introduction

When American women obtained the vote in 1920, many people expected that a women's voting bloc would alter the shape of politics in the future. However, for the next 60 years, women voted similarly to their male relatives. In 1980, a gender gap in voting did emerge when the Republican presidential candidate, Ronald Reagan, received 54% of men's votes and only 46% of women's (Abzug & Kelber 1984). Women are now significantly more likely to vote for Democratic candidates than are men. In the last five presidential elections, a majority of women voted for the Democratic presidential candidate, while a majority of men voted for the Republican candidate. In the 2016 election, 54 percent of women voted for Clinton, while 52 percent of men voted for Trump (e.g., Bump 2018).

Polls have shown that men and women tend to have different views of government's roles. For example, over the years, men have proven to be substantially more supportive of U. S. government war efforts than women.

In contrast, women have been more supportive of government programs that provide public services and, particularly, safety nets for those in trouble than have men (e.g., Kenshaft & Clark 2016: 256-7.)

The question that drives our analysis in this paper is why the gender gap in political preference emerged in the 1980s and why it persists today. Our review of the relevant literature indicates that two major large-scale changes have been identified, both of which have expanded women's opportunities and responsibilities. These changes are 1) the enormous increase, since 1970, in women's labor-force participation and 2) the equally enormous increase in women living outside of marriage. We also theorize that the decline of unions and the greater likelihood of both women and men living outside of marriage have played a role, especially in distancing of men from the Democratic Party. We test the relative contribution of each of these changes to the gender gap in political preference using a data set not commonly analyzed in examining that gap. The General Social Survey (GSS) data we use allows us to examine

changes in the gender gap in political affiliation at more frequent intervals than does presidential election data.

Labor Force Participation

The first explanation for the gender gap in voting involves women's labor force participation. Since the 1970s, there has been a tremendous increase in female participation in the workforce, an increase that we capture, in one way, in Figure 1. The percentage of women working full time almost doubled (from 25% to 46.4%) between 1972 and 1994 and has remained nearly at this level ever since. We prefer to use the percentage of women working full time in this paper, over the more conventional measure of the percentage of women in the labor force, since it is a truer indicator, in our view, of women's financial independence from men. (See Figure 1 in Appendix A.)

Women's labor force participation, the theory goes, affects their involvement in politics in several ways. One has to do with reference groups. At work, women are exposed to other women's views about politics. It is typical for women to talk about political campaigns, candidates, and government policies (Manza & Brooks 1998). Hearing other women's beliefs about politics is likely to influence the way women think about these ideas. When women don't work, they do not have as much opportunity to talk about topics like politics with other women because their domain is more likely to be confined to their homes. As a result, they are more likely to subscribe to the political views of their marital (or other) partner. Participation in the labor force serves as a source of political socialization and expands the knowledge of its occupants. For women, this is especially likely to lead to their greater political involvement.

In addition, employment introduces women to a new set of roles. Holding a job opens questions about appropriate gender roles, questions that some women will not have previously faced. It reinforces a sense of women's ability. Employment inspires more feminist-centered goals and increases women's desire for political activism (Manza & Brooks 1998). This, in turn, may lead women to be more liberal and Democratic.

Finally, working for pay may give women a sense of financial independence because they do not have to rely on their partners for money. In many instances, however, women are paid less than men and the types of careers they pursue are limited to what are deemed "women's work." This, in turn, increases their awareness of and support for governmental "safety net" programs

(Inglehart & Norris 2000) like Section 8, Medicare, school breakfast and lunch programs, and more (Welch & Hibbing 1992). For these several reasons, we speculate that women's participation in the workforce will be associated with increases in the political gender gap.

Women's Experience of Marital Decline

Other explanations for the gender gap in political preference-- its emergence and its longevity have focused on the rise of divorce rates, delayed marriage and unmarried motherhood. These factors have left many women as single parents fending alone to care for their children and family members who are elderly, sick, or disabled. Data on the likelihood that women and men live in marital relationships are shown in Figure 2 (in Appendix A.) Figure 2 presents changes over time in the percentage of General Social Survey respondents who reported being married by survey year. Specifically, in 1974, 74.8% of women reported being married, while only 48.7% of them did so in 2016. (See Figure 2 in Appendix A.)

Women's declining chances of being married, an effect of both increased divorce rates and later age at marriage (Stritof 2019), has increased their chances of having a Democratic affiliation for several reasons. Perhaps most important, marriage creates partnerships in which women perceive their self-interests being linked to men and, generally, in which they receive resource transfers from men "in exchange for access to children" (Edlund & Pande 2002:923). Married couples are also more likely to have a greater financial security than single people. Financial stability translates into being more likely to lean Republican (Wilson & Lusztig 2004:980).

Non-marriage, on the other hand, can lead women to see their fate as linked to those of other women (Stout, Kretschmer & Ruppner 2017). In general, the Democratic Party, more so than the Republican Party, is viewed as supporting programs that advance those "linked fates." The Democratic Party, for example, favors welfare programs and programs that help people through tough times. Low-income single women are apt to use such programs and lean towards the party that supports such programs (Edlund & Pande 2002:925) and other single women are apt to see such programs as positive, too. The Democratic Party also supports other women's issues, such as abortion/birth control issues, equal pay for men and women, and efforts to limit sexual assaults (the #MeToo Movement). Consequently, we hypothesize that, when women are

unmarried, the political gender gap between them and men will be larger.

De-Unionization

While the “labor force participation” and “women’s experience of marital decline” explanations of the gender gap in political affiliation speak to why women’s affiliation may have begun to be independent of men’s in the 1980s (and, perhaps, grown thereafter), these explanations do not really speak to why men’s political affiliation did not continue to parallel women’s political leanings. They imply that both greater labor force participation and lower marriage rates will have led women to hope for government policies that are supportive of individuals, and therefore lean Democratic. But why would not men who experience lower marriage rates have become more Democratic, too?

There have been certain societal trends, other than the decline in marriage, which might have led men to vote Democratic. Since the 1960s, the American industrial economy has thinned, thanks in part both to automation and to outsourcing. These factors have deprived less-educated men of many relatively high-paying manufacturing and construction jobs (e.g., Kenschaff & Clark 2016:41-47). This de-industrialization, plus an accompanying growth of income and wealth inequality (e.g., Piketty & Saez 2003), might have led to a greater allegiance of less-educated men to the Democratic Party, the party traditionally less associated with the interests of big business and more likely to pursue programs that support the relatively powerless.

But recognition of, and action on behalf of, economic and political interests requires organization. And there is one notable modality for such organization that has suffered enormously since the 1950s: unions. While 33.2% of American workers were unionized in 1955, 10.5% were unionized in 2018 (Bureau of Labor 2019 and Meyer, 2004). As a consequence, the historic synergy between working class people and the Democratic Party, facilitated by union membership (e.g., McGarrity 2001), has been challenged. In fact, de-unionization has contributed to working-class (maybe particularly white working-class) disaffection from the established political system (Milkman, 2018), leading to generally lower voter turnout, perhaps especially among men (Kenschaff & Clark 2016:258). Milkman (2018) argues that the resentment that feelings of powerlessness create has made working-class men especially receptive to populist entreaties on the part of politicians from the left or right. This variable can help explain the election

of Donald Trump, the Republican candidate, in 2016.

There are several reasons to believe that de-unionization may have led more men to become more Republican than women. However, one does not really have to go any further than to recognize that more men than women have left unions since the 1970s. While 25% of men had unionized jobs in 1983, only about 12% did so in 2015. The comparable figures for women—14% and 11%—indicate a much smaller decline (Center for Economic and Policy Research 2016). We speculate that loss of union ties, then, have made more men than women susceptible to a Republican affiliation that those ties might have hindered earlier. In any case, we hypothesize that de-unionization will be associated with an increase in the political gender gap.

Men’s Experience of Marital Decline

The flip side of the divorce (and delayed marriage) revolution’s effect on women’s chances of affiliating with the Democratic Party is its likely effect on men’s chances of affiliating with the Republican Party. If marriage is conceived of as exchanges of men’s economic resources for “access to children” (Edlund & Pande 2002:923), then a decline in marriage meant for many men they could retain those economic resources, making them wealthier and, hence, even more likely to side, politically, with the political party (Republican) most interested in protecting personal wealth. Moreover, marriage tends to create a primary reference group in the spouse not only for women, but also for men. In fact, it is well known that men tend benefit more from marriage than women, in terms of health gains and other tangible indicators of their connection to a spouse (e.g., Harvard Health Publishing 2019)—this, largely because of their relationship to one significant other, a wife. In the absence of a wife, however, men may become less concerned about the “linked fate” of all women, and therefore turn away from the party (Democratic) that evinces the greater support for women’s concerns. In short, we expect that as men’s chances of being unmarried increased, the gender gap in political affiliation will have increased.

Methods

We were interested in how the political leanings, and not just the attitudes towards particular presidential candidates, of men and women changed over time, and particularly how they changed during the 1980s and later. We aimed therefore to measure both the political

affiliation of women and men at relative short (one- and two-year) intervals and the aggregate political party affiliation of men and women in each of the five decades since 1970.

The General Social Survey (GSS) asks the question, “Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, Independent, or what?” in each of 31 national surveys since 1972 (the last, as of this writing, in 2018). The responses are coded into seven categories: strong Democrat; not strong Democrat; Independent but near Democrat; Independent; Independent but near Republican; not strong Republican; and strong Republican. We combined the first three response options into the broad category “Democrat,” the last three into the broad category “Republican,” and retained the Independent category separately. For the first part of our analysis, we showed how the difference between the percentage of females and males who claimed to be Democrats changed in individual surveys over time.

We then used the GSS question, “Last week were you working full time, part time, going to school, keeping house, or what?” to measure how women’s and men’s work status has changed over the years since it was first asked in the 1972 GSS. The eight response options the GSS used for this variable are “working fulltime;” “working part time;” “temporarily not working;” “unemployed or laid off;” “retired;” “school;” “keeping house;” and “other.” We recoded this variable into two broad response options: “working fulltime” and “not working fulltime.” For the second part of the analysis, we showed how the percentages of females and males who were working fulltime changed in individual surveys over time.

The GSS also asks a question about marital status: “Are you currently -- married, widowed, divorced, separated, or have you never been married?” We recoded this variable into two categories: “married” and “not married.” The third part of our analysis involved showing how the percentage of females and males who were married varied over time.

In subsequent analyses, we examined differences in male and female political affiliation by decade and then used this greater number of aggregate cases to study the effects of women’s employment and marital status on those differences.

In our analysis, we looked at the relative strength of association between the percentage of women “married” and “working fulltime,” on one hand, and our measure of the political gender gap (the percentage of women with a Democratic affiliation minus the percentage

of men with such an affiliation) over the 31 periods. We then compared each of these associations with the associations between the percentage of American workers who were unionized (data from Bureau of Labor 2019 and Meyer 2004) and the percentage of men “married” and “working fulltime” and the gender gap. Finally, we used stepwise regression to sort out which of the independent variables had the greatest effect, over time, on changes in the gender gap.

Results

Figure 3 in Appendix A shows the trend for our measure of the gender gap in political preference: the percentage of women claiming they are Democrats minus the percentage of men who claim to be Democrats. Throughout the 1970s, men and women had a similar likelihood to claim Democratic affiliation, despite a small peak in 1973. However, in the 1980s women’s likelihood to claim being Democrats pulled ahead. By 1989, the difference between women and men stood at 8.5%.

In the 1990’s, the gap increased overall, although with a few spikes. The first spike was in 1991. We believe this spike is associated with the Gulf War which started in 1990 and ended in 1991. Surveys have shown that, typically, men are more likely to support war than women (e.g., Kenschaft & Clark 2016:255ff.) and, in general, that the Republican Party has been more likely to support war than the Democratic Party. Another spike occurred in 1996, the year that the “Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act” was passed. President Clinton was pressured into signing this act by a Congress that was a majority Republican at the time, even though he had already vetoed two other pieces of legislation that threatened the safety net for poor families (Schafer 2017). We believe that the spike in women’s support for the Democratic Party is connected to the fact that women were sticking by the party that generally fought against these welfare reform programs. In 2010, Barack Obama signed the Affordable Care Act (ACA) or “Obamacare.” The ACA was aimed at helping families get the healthcare they needed at a lower cost. This Democratic legislation was much more popular among women than men; hence, another spike in the political gender gap appeared in 2010. (See **Figure 3** in Appendix A.)

Using all the General Social Surveys between 1970 and 1980 combined, Table 1 shows that, during the 1970s, there was very little difference in women and men’s political leanings. During this decade, 62.8% of males

and 63.4% of females identified with the Democratic Party. The gamma relating political preference and gender was $-.01$, showing that females were **not** more likely than males to lean Democratic during the 1970's. (See **Table 1** in Appendix B.)

In **Table 2** in Appendix B, we look at the 1980s, 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s. In the 80s, the relationship between gender and political leanings starts to grow. 53.4% of men reported leaning Democratic, while 58.5% of women did so. The relationship grows even stronger in 1990. Nearly 58% of females reported leaning Democratic, while only 48.2% of men did so. In the 2000s and 2010s, the relationship had been established and remained steady, showing women are more likely to lean Democratic than men are in those decades as well. (See **Table 2** in Appendix B.)

We expected that women who were unmarried and worked full time would be more likely to be Democrats than either married women who did **not** work full time or unmarried men who worked full time. **Table 3** in Appendix B looks at the combination effects of marriage and labor force participation on party affiliation by gender. The data in **Table 3** show that males and females who are married and **do not** work full time have similar likelihoods of being Democrats in all decades under examination. Specifically, 62.6% of such males were Democrats in the 1970s, while 60.9% of such women were. **Table 3** also shows a similar relationship as time progresses. By the 2010s, for example, 49.8% of men who were married and **did not** work fulltime were Democrats, while 48.2% of such women were.

Much more change was evident when we compared men and women who were unmarried and worked full time. **Table 3** shows that in the 1970s, unmarried men who worked full time were more likely to be Democrats (69%) than comparable women (65.3%). However, this was the last decade when such men were more likely to be Democrats than were women who were unmarried and worked full time. After the 1970s, unmarried women who worked full time remained predominantly Democratic. In the 1980s, 63.2% of unmarried women who worked full time claimed to be Democrats as were 65.8% of such women in the 1990s, 67.6% in the 2000s, and 67.4% in the 2010s. In every decade, unmarried women who were working full time were substantially more likely to lean Democratic than married who were unmarried men **did not** work full time. (See **Table 3** in Appendix B.)

Although unmarried women who worked full time retained a high likelihood of leaning Democratic over the decades, unmarried men who worked full time

became much less likely to do so. From the 1970s to the 1980s, there was an 18% *decrease* in the tendency of unmarried men who worked full time to say they leaned Democratic. In the 1970s, 69% of such men claimed to be Democrats. In the 1980s, that number plummeted to 51%. In subsequent decades, the percentage of unmarried men who worked full time and claimed to be Democrats was static, remaining at just above 50% in every decade. (See **Table 3** in Appendix B.)

A possible explanation for the gender gap in party affiliation is that the economic experiences of these males and females are so different. Men who are unmarried and work fulltime are much more likely than comparable women to earn a decent income and to live a more financially stable lifestyle. Such men are more likely to align themselves with the party that tends to be associated with protections for the wealthy: The Republican Party. Divorced women, especially those with children, typically need more help from the government than do divorced men.

We observed that unmarried men who worked fulltime, rather than comparable women, had political leanings that changed dramatically after the 1970s. This finding raises the question of whether the conventional explanations of "women entering the labor force" and "fewer women were married" for the political gender gap are completely adequate. It seems that these explanations cannot do complete justice to the changing political attitudes of men. The data in **Tables 4** and **5** help to address this question.

Table 4 in Appendix B shows the zero-order correlations between our measure of the political gender gap (the percentage of females claiming to lean Democratic minus the percentage of men doing so) over the 31 survey periods, with several variables, measured at those survey periods, theorized to affect change in the political gender gap. The percentage of women working fulltime ($r = .71$) and percentage of women married ($-.73$) have very strong correlations with the gap and are in the directions predicted by the "women entering the labor force" and the "fewer women married" theses. The "percentage of American workers in unions" has a slightly stronger correlation ($r = -.75$) than either of these two variables and suggests that men's role in the creation of the gender gap may be crucial because men were much more likely to have belonged to unions than women. Finally, though, it is the percentage of married men that has the strongest correlation ($r = -.77$) with the gap of all the variables we examined here. This correlation strengthens the argument that understanding changes in men's lives

is very important if we want to fully understand the emergence and maintenance of the gender gap in political affiliation. This finding is consistent with our previous speculation that remaining single or regaining singleness likely increases men's average wealth, while it decreases women's average wealth. It follows that men, more than women, would express attachment to the Republican rather than the Democratic party. (See **Table 4** in Appendix B.)

Table 5 in Appendix B presents a modest test of which of the variables listed in **Table 4** explain the most variation in the rise of the gender gap in political affiliation when others are controlled. **Table 5** reports on a stepwise regression involving all of those variables. In the resulting model, two variables—the percentage of men married and the percentage of women working fulltime—make it into the equation. A beta of $-.53$ indicates that, as the percentage of men married decreased, the gender gap increased, even with the percentage of women working fulltime controlled. And a beta of $.32$ indicates that as the percentage of women working fulltime increased, the gender gap increased as well, even with the percentage of men married controlled. Together these two variables explain 61% of the variance in the political gender gap over time (adjusted r square = $.61$). (See **Table 5** in Appendix B.)

One major equivocation needs to be emphasized here: There are high degrees of inter-correlation among all variables introduced in the model presented in **Table 5**, so this table should not be seen as eliminating any of the theories that guided this analysis. One message stands, however: If one wants to explain the emergence of, and variation in, the political gender gap over the last 50 years, one needs to take into account not only what has happened to make women's political leanings independent of men's, but also what has helped to make men's political leanings independent of women's.

CONCLUSION

Our findings show considerable support for the two mainstream explanations of the emergence and maintenance of a gender gap in political preference in the United States: 1) that it results from a combination of women's increased labor force participation and 2) from women's decreased likelihood of being married. In fact, when we compare the political preferences of married men and women who are not working full time in each decade since the 1970s, we find there is *no statistically significant difference* in political leaning between the genders for any of those decades, even using

very large samples. When we do the same comparison of unmarried men and women who are working full time, however, we find a *significant and substantial gap* during the 1980s-- a gap that widens in later decades. We suspect that this latter change has much to do with working women developing relationships with other women in the workplace, relationships that inspire feminist consciousness and goals (e.g., Inglehart & Norris 2000; Manza & Brooks 1998) and unmarried women seeing their fates being linked to those of other women (e.g., Stout, Kretchmer & Ruppaner 2017) and less tied to those of particular men, their husbands (e.g., Edlund & Pande 2002).

Our analysis of the comparison involving unmarried men and women who are working full time, however, revealed that it was not women's likelihood of claiming Democratic-Party leanings that changed the most over the decades. It was men's leanings. In fact, while the percentage of unmarried women, working full time, who claimed Democratic affiliation hardly changed at all over time, similar men's likelihood of doing so dropped considerably. This observation led us to consider that the mainstream explanations for the gender gap in political party affiliation might have over-emphasized the importance of women's growing independence and under-emphasized men's changing political affiliation. We speculated that the decreased likelihood of men declaring a Democratic Party affiliation might be related to another notable trend in American society since 1970: the fact that workers, and particularly male workers, have become much less likely to have labor union affiliations than they did in previous decades. Using a correlation analysis involving 31 data points, we found tentative support for this outcome. We theorize that men's detachment from unions may have involved a similar detachment from the Democratic Party, thanks in large part to the strong support of unions for that party.

Finally, our stepwise regression involving men's declining chances of being married showed that this variable, plus women's increasing working status, were the only variables that survived the cut even when the variables of union membership and women's chances of being married were included. This slightly unexpected finding underscores the main point of this paper: that we may not completely understand the gender gap in political affiliation unless we take seriously the experiences of men as well as women. Men's declining chances of being married may mean that they have not only been less likely to share mutual concerns with one significant woman (a wife) who might have compelled

an interest in the Democratic Party. Singleness may also mean that men have been able to retain a greater portion of their income and, consequently, have been more likely to turn to the party that most aims to protect high income earners and their property: The Republican Party.

There are some notable limitations to this study. One limitation is that, while certain variables like women's work status and men's marital status may explain general trends in the political gender gap, they will never be enough to account for local variation in the gender gap. Ever since polling on such issues has been done, men have tended to have more positive attitudes towards entering wars, and less positive attitudes towards legislation supporting safety nets, than women (e.g., Kenshaft & Clark 2016). Thus, we find that the gender gap in political affiliation made short-term leaps in 1991, during the first Gulf War, and in 1996 and 2010, when the Welfare Reform Act and the Affordable Care Act, respectively, were at issue. It is beyond the scope of this, and probably any social science, paper to offer a model that might predict such local variation.

Perhaps an even more significant limitation, however, is imposed by the small number of data points available to analyze and the high degree of inter-correlation that exists among key variables. Thirty-one data points in a time series analysis means that the tests of models involving more than a small number of variables are impossible. These tests are especially challenging when key variables are as highly inter-related as they are in our analysis. Most obvious, for our purposes, is the necessarily high correlation of men's and women's chances of being married over time. Clearly as one has decreased since 1970 the other has decreased as well. Consequently, we are suspicious of our finding that men's chances might be more useful for the explanation of the emergence of the political gender gap than women's. That both variables are also highly correlated, over time, with America's de-unionization, calls into question another suggested conclusion we made in this paper: The role played by de-unionization in the emergence of the gender gap in political affiliation.

Finally, we recognize that our analysis is plagued by questions of sampling and measurement error. The General Social Survey has generally aspired to, and achieved, what is known as a multistage cluster probability sample. But when all critical independent variables are as similar in their strength of association with the dependent variable (all here were associated with the political gender gap at anywhere from .71 for the percentage of women working fulltime to -.77

for percentage of men married), then sampling or measurement errors in any of the variables can make a substantial difference in the findings.

Nonetheless, this paper raises an important question for future researchers to pursue: Is it almost as likely that what has happened to men accounts for the emergence and maintenance of the political gender gap as what has happened to women?

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
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
Appendix A

Figure 1. Percentage of Women and Men Working Full Time, 1972-2018




Source: General Social Survey, 2018

Figure 2. Percentage of Women and Men Reporting They were Married, 1972-2018



Source: General Social Survey, 2018



Source: General Social Survey data, 1972-2018, via the CMS, Berkeley.

Appendix B

Table 1. Gender and Political Party Identification, 1970-1980

| | Males | Females | | |
|----------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-------|--|
| Democrat | 62.8% (3093) | 63.4% (3538) | | |
| Republican | 34.7% (1707) | 34.6% (1936) | | |
| Independent or Other | 2.5% (122) | 2.0% (112) | | |
| | N=10,506 | Gamma= -.01 | p=.25 | |

Source: General Social Survey data.

Table 2. Gender and Political Party Identification by Decade, 1981-2018

| Decade | % of Men Who are Democrats | % of Women Who are Democrats | N | Gamma | Significance Level |
|-----------|----------------------------------|------------------------------------|--------|-------|-----------------------|
| 1981-1990 | 53.4 | 58.5 | 12,456 | -.10 | <.001 |
| 1991-2000 | 48.2 | 57.8 | 12,271 | -.18 | <.001 |
| 2001-2010 | 50.1 | 57.9 | 11,319 | -.14 | <.001 |
| 2011-2018 | 51.4 | 59.3 | 7,797 | -.14 | <.001 |

Source: General Social Survey data.

Table 3. Gender and Political Party Affiliation for Sub-Samples of Respondents by Decade, 1970-2018

| Sub-Samples of Respondents by Decade | % of Males | % of Females | N | Gamma | Significance Level |
|--------------------------------------|------------|--------------|------|-------|--------------------|
| 1970-1980 | | | | | |
| Unmarried & Working Full-time | 69.0 | 65.3 | 1200 | .09 | p=.02 |
| Married & Not Working Full time | 62.6 | 60.9 | 3971 | .04 | p=.63 |
| 1981-1990 | | | | | |
| Unmarried & Working Full time | 51.0 | 63.2 | 2063 | -.24 | p<.001 |
| Married & Not Working Full time | 57.9 | 59.5 | 3809 | .07 | p=.23 |
| 1991-2000 | | | | | |
| Unmarried & Working Full time | 51.5 | 65.8 | 2587 | -.29 | p<.001 |
| Married & Not Working Full time | 54.4 | 50.9 | 3098 | .07 | p=.12 |
| 2001-2010 | | | | | |
| Unmarried & Working Full time | 54.5 | 67.6 | 2319 | -.25 | p<.001 |
| Married & Not Working Full time | 50.4 | 47.3 | 2965 | .06 | p=.32 |
| 2011-2018 | | | | | |
| Unmarried & Working Full time | 55.5 | 67.4 | 1628 | -.23 | p<.001 |
| Married & Not Working Full time | 49.8 | 48.2 | 2090 | .03 | p=.87 |

Table 4. Correlations of Political Gender Gap with Other Variables Over 31 Survey Periods

| Other Variables | Political Gender Gap (1) |
|--|--------------------------|
| Percentage of Women Working Fulltime | .71*** |
| Percentage of Women Married | -.73*** |
| Percentage of American Workers in Unions | -.75*** |
| Unemployment rate | -.31 |
| Percentage of Men Married | -.77*** |

Notes: *** indicates significance at .001 level; (1) Political gender gap = percentage of women reporting they lean Democratic minus percentage of men reporting they lean Democratic.

Table 5. Stepwise Regression of the Political Gender Gap on the Percentage of Women Working Fulltime, the Percentage of Women Married, the Unemployment Rate, the Percentage of American Workers in Unions, the Percentage of Men Working Fulltime, and the Percentage of Men Married

| | Political Gender Gap (1) |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| Percentage of Men Married | -.53** |
| Percentage of Women Working Fulltime | .32* |
| N | 31 |
| Adjusted R square | .61 |

Notes: We excluded variables with .10 entry criterion: Percentage of Women Married, Unemployment Rate, Percentage of American Workers in Unions and Percentage of Men Working Fulltime; * indicates significance at .10 level; **, at the .01 level.