

What Happened to Americans' Trust in Social Institutions Over Time, Especially During the Latter Half of the Trump Administration and the Beginning of the Covid Pandemic?

By

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Abstract

It is well documented that Americans' trust in many major social institutions has declined for at least half a century. Our objective in this paper is to do two things. First, we use General Social Survey (GSS) data collected between 1973 and 2021 to document this trend for 12 specific social institutions. Second, and more significantly, we focus on changes in Americans' trust in five social institutions: the military, education, medicine, science, and the press between 2018 to 2021. This time frame marked the latter years of the Trump administration and the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic. We interpret what happened to Americans' confidence in these social institutions with a theory offered by Yuval Levin in his 2020 book, *A Time to Build*. Based on our observations, we also offer qualifications to Levin's theme that trust in institutions is primarily a function of the way institutional 'insiders' behave.

Keywords: Americans' trust in social institutions, institutional 'insiders,' political polarization

Literature Review

Social scientists and social commentators have observed a general decline in Americans' trust in institutions for some time. As early as 2005, Paxton reported that "Americans' trust in various institutions has . . . [continued to drop] since the 1970s" (Paxton 2005: 44). This trend continues to be remarkable, but not completely uniform, across major American institutions. The General Social Survey (GSS) collected data on Americans' confidence in twelve social institutions since 1973, and we present data about this confidence in **Figures 1 through 12** in **Appendix A**, showing how that the percentage of Americans who had "some or "a great deal" of confidence *changed* between 1973 and 2021 and the overall pattern and direction of the changes. **Figures 1 through 5** present data on confidence levels in the U.S. Congress, the press, the executive branch of government, education and organized religion, all of which *suffered clear losses in public confidence* over the period. It is beyond the scope

of this paper to account for the enormous fluctuations in confidence in particular institutions over time. It has been argued, for instance, that one reason for the periods of the biggest loss in confidence in Congress has been the increasing polarization, the increased inability to agree on legislation, of the two major parties (e.g., Levin 2020; Klein 2020). Given this account, it is perhaps not surprising that Congress enjoyed a brief increase in trust in 2002, when the parties united in their joint response to 9/11. (**See Figure 1.**) The great drop in confidence in the executive branch in 1974 undoubtedly reflects the impeachment of President Nixon and the great rise in 1977, the election of the much more trusted President Ford. (**See Figure 3.**) It is also probable that the drop in confidence in organized religion between 2000 and 2002 had something to do with the priest scandal that was uncovered in that period (e.g., Clark & Grandchamp 2011). (**See Figure 5.**) Finally, the precipitous drops in confidence experienced by financial institutions (**Figure 7**) and major companies (**Figure 8**) between 2008 and 2010 undoubtedly had to do with their perceived role

in the “Great Recession” and the rebound in confidence in these institutions during the 2010s, to the rebound of the economy. Trying to account for all the ups and downs in confidence experienced by the twelve institutions shown from in the twelve figures would be a fruitful subject for future authors. But we cannot do so here. We will just point out that each of the first five figures suggest very substantial decreases in the percentage of respondents reporting “some” or “a great deal” of confidence in the relevant institutions: from about 85% to 46% for Congress in 1973 and in 2021, respectively; from about 85% to 52% for the press; from about 81% to 56% for the executive branch; from about 92% to 78% for education; and from about 85% to 66% for organized religion. **Figures 6, 7 and 8** suggest that drops in confidence in medicine, financial institutions and major companies also occurred over the period, although these drops were not as dramatic as they were for Congress, the press, the executive branch, education and organized religion: only a little over three percent for medicine, if one compares the beginning and end points; about 12% for financial institutions; and about 11% for major companies.

Three institutions (science, organized labor and the U.S. Supreme Court) are perhaps better described as *not* having experienced much overall change in the percentage of respondents saying they had “some” or “a great deal” of confidence. The percentage expressing confidence in science was at about 93% in both 1973 and 2021; the percentage for organized labor rose only 2%, from 73% to 75% in 1973 and 2021, respectively; and the percentage doing so in the Supreme Court was just over 84% in 1973 and 2018, though this percentage did drop to 80% during the 2018 to 2021 period, when President Trump, and the Senate, added conservative justices.

One institution, the military, experienced a *net increase* in public trust covered by the GSS from 81% to almost 94% between 1973 and 2018, though this institution experienced a significant loss of confidence (to about 89%) between 2018 and 2021. We will look at this loss in more detail below. But our goal in this paper is to examine recommendations made for improving trust in institutions in one recent contribution to the literature—Yuval Levin’s 2020 book, *A Time to Build*. We do this with special focus on change in trust in five institutions (the military, science, medicine, education and the press) during the most recent GSS inter-survey period (2018 to 2021). First, we look at Levin’s new approach.

A Promising New Approach to the Decline in Trust

One approach towards improving trust in institutions suggests that we take them apart and start again. Presumably reflecting a common populist sentiment, Donald Trump ran for President partly on a promise of “draining the swamp” in Washington. This, and other approaches, captured in calls for “cleaning house,” imply that the best way to have institutions we can trust is to dismantle the ones we have and start anew.

This is not the approach offered by Yuval Levin, a conservative theorist, in his recent book, *A Time to Build*. Levin posits that it is not time to destroy but to rebuild the institutions (from family to religious organizations to the press to congress) that already exist. At their best, Levin argues, institutions serve many useful purposes, including the pursuit of core societal goals. At their best, they also provide individuals who work within them a sense of personal meaning, connection and growth. In Levin’s terms, institutions can be *formative* for individuals who work within them, giving them purpose and the skills to pursue that purpose.

Levin asserts that the basic reason why people have lost trust in institutions is that some people *inside them* do not view their roles within the institutions as *formative* for themselves and others, but rather as platforms for performance—as “when the presidency and Congress are just stages for political performance art . . . [or] when journalism is indistinguishable from activism” (2022: 34). One need only think of recently newly elected members of the U.S. Congress who have come to Washington not so much to learn how to pass legislation (Congress’s purpose) but to tell other congresspeople, as well as the rest of the country, what Congress *should be* doing.

Levin claims that the solution to the problem of declining trust in institutions is not one of outsiders criticizing these institutions to the point of their dissolution, but for insiders to do their jobs with “devotion.” “[T]he simplest way [to build trust] is for the people who inhabit our institutions—that is, all of us—to be more trustworthy” (2020: 200). This simple solution—for those within institutions to do their jobs more conscientiously—is the focus of this paper and one we examine critically here.

We accept Levin’s point that behavior on the part of actors within an institution (what Levin calls “insiders”) can undermine or enhance people’s confidence or trust in that institution. For example, it is likely that some of the diminution of trust in religious organizations that occurred between 2000 and 2002 reflected publicized

scandals about clergy abuse in the Catholic Church during that period. And that the huge one-year boost in American's confidence in the military in 1991 had to do with performance—both of leaders and enlisted men—in the first Gulf War. And yet we do *not* believe that trust in an institution is simply a matter of what insiders do. Levin himself occasionally seems to recognize this, too. In arguing that journalists need to report more responsibly to enhance the reputation of the press and media, Levin also points out that “journalists should recognize that their profession may have a particularly important role to play in any recovery of confidence in [other] American institutions” (2000: 86). If we had more trust in the press, it could keep us from imagining the worst about major institutions even while it uncovered abuses in them.

The possible effect that representatives of one institution can have on trust in another institution is one that we examine at greater length here by using General Social Survey (GSS) data from the 2018 to 2021 inter-survey period. We examine the interaction between a member of the executive branch of government, former President Donald Trump, and the increasing or decreasing trust in five American institutions: the military, the press, science, medicine and education. We focus on these five institutions because they are ones on which then former President Trump took a clear stance during the years of his administration—institutions about which he might, therefore, reasonably be expected to have influenced public opinion. We conclude our literature review by presenting five hypotheses regarding the interaction between Trump's expressed views and public confidence.

The Military

Figure 12 shows that, between 1973 and 2021, trust in the military *generally rose*. In general, Americans' trust seems to have been a direct function of military engagement somewhere in the world, with the possible exception of its participation in Vietnam.¹ The first Gulf War in 1991 led to a huge but one-time increase in confidence. Military engagement in Afghanistan (beginning in 2001) and Iraq (2003) was generally associated with a long-term improvement in trust—

¹After the United States withdrew from Vietnam in 1973, there was actually a reasonably substantial increase in the public's confidence through much of the rest of the 1970s, until it dropped to new lows in the 1980. Because it began in 1973, the General Social Survey does not permit us to comment on public trust in the military in the early years of the Vietnam war.

until the most recent inter-survey period, the one we focus on here, from 2018 to 2021. (See **Figure 12 in Appendix A.**)

Why American's trust in the military fell during this period can be accounted for using theoretical tools given us by Levin (2020). Beginning in 2019, the US began withdrawing troops from Iraq and, beginning in 2020, from Afghanistan. In both cases, this may have raised doubts in the minds of many Americans that the military had done its job in those countries, since neither conflict had been clearly “won.” Moreover, by withdrawing from Afghanistan, it may have become particularly clear that early reports that the mission was going smoothly, and that Afghan troops, specifically, were prepared to withstand Taliban assaults, had been untrustworthy (e.g., Dowzicky 2022).

Our modification of Levin's theory, however, leads to a more nuanced hypothesis about what was going on with Americans' trust in the military during the 2018-2019 period. Levels of trust in the military have differed by political party: Republicans tend to have been more trusting than Democrats. But in 2020, President Trump frequently spoke of the need to use the military to deal with civil disturbances and social justice protests (Shane III 2021). Famously, police and national guard troops were used to clear out demonstrators to permit former President Trump to do a photo-op outside a church near the White House (Cammarata 2021). We believe Trump's beliefs about the usefulness of the military for suppressing domestic protest would have been more troubling to Democrats than to Republicans because the protests and demonstrations were usually in support of liberal causes. Trump's asserted beliefs, and their likely differing effects on his supporters and detractors, lead us to a slightly different view from that which Levin's theory alone might have led us to: that **Democrats' loss of trust in the military during the 2018-2021 period will have been substantially greater than the loss experienced by Republicans.**

The Scientific Community

The Covid-19 pandemic put science and scientists in a prominent position during the 2018-2021 period—perhaps in a more prominent position than they had enjoyed for decades (Funk and Tyson 2022). Scientists like Dr. Anthony Fauci captured news headlines and television audiences daily. Many Americans, indeed, many world citizens, listened for advice about how best to protect themselves from the virus . . . and rooted for scientists to come up with a preventions and cures. In a

sense, **Figure 9** gives a slightly misleading sense of what happened to Americans' trust in science between 2018 and 2021: it shows that the percentage who had "some" or "a great deal" of trust in science remained the same, at about 93.4 percent. But when we disaggregate this number, we find that the percentage who had a "great deal" of trust rose substantially from 45.2 percent to 50.4 percent. (See **Figure 9** in **Appendix A**.)

However, the degree to which Americans used the advice and trusted the preventions and cures those scientists came up with was again filtered through a political lens—a lens that was to some degree created by Donald Trump. In August of 2020, Libby Cathey (2020) could assert that "President Trump has found a new foil -- in science" and cited a report from the Union of Concerned Scientists which asserted there were already 11 times when the Trump administration directly undermined Centers for Disease Controls' recommendations for dealing with the virus. The report also claimed the administration had directly contradicted scientists' recommendations about dealing with climate change at least 150 times. After all, Trump did pull the US out of the Paris climate agreement in 2017. Trump's disproportionate influence on Republicans, then, leads us to our second hypothesis that **trust in science will have risen more for Democrats during the 2018-2021 period than it will have done for Republicans.**

Education

As **Figure 4** shows, trust in education has fluctuated dramatically, but *generally decreased* since the early 1970s. A dramatic decrease occurred during the 1980s. The Reagan administration surely played a part in this, inasmuch as one of former President Reagan's stated goals was to abolish the Education Department and his Secretary of Education sponsored a commission that produced a report, "A Nation at Risk," that received much notoriety and was highly critical of American education (Ravitch 1990). The next big drastic decrease was not until the 2018-2021 period, which is the one we focus on here. During this period, specifically at the beginning of 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic caused students to learn remotely for a long time. This course of action led many to question whether students were receiving a solid education. (See **Figure 4** in **Appendix A**.)

President Trump frequently spoke, in 2020, of educational systems failing to provide students with in-person learning. He also spoke of his concerns about schools teaching the "1619 Project" and "Critical

Race Theory" (Liptak 2020). Also significant was the President's advocacy of a voucher system which would have enabled parents to put children in private schools and its implicit (and explicit) criticism of public education (Black 2020). Trump's criticism of public education (its modes of teaching, its content, and its comparative undesirability more generally) leads us to our third hypothesis that **the loss of trust in the educational institution by Democrats during the 2018-2021 period will have been smaller than the loss experienced by Republicans.**

Medicine

The COVID-19 pandemic put people in the pharmaceutical industry to work during the 2018-2021 era. In less than a year after COVID's outbreak, in 2020, pharmaceutical companies, including Pfizer, Moderna, and Johnson and Johnson, came out with suitable vaccines that were tested, tried and proved to provide remarkable protection. As can be seen in **Figure 6**, between 2018 and 2021, American's trust in medicine *increased considerably*. (See **Figure 6** in **Appendix A**.)

Nonetheless, Mr. Trump expressed hesitancy about the vaccines and his hesitancy influenced others (Stoler et al. 2022). Trump's disproportionate influence on Republicans leads us to our fourth hypothesis that **trust in medicine will have risen more for Democrats during the 2018-2021 period than it will have done for Republicans.**

The Press

As shown in **Figure 2**, Americans' trust in the press has generally been in decline since the 1970s. In 1973, over 85% of Americans reported having "only some" or "a great deal" of confidence in the press. In the nearly half century since then, trust in the press has dropped more than 32 percentage points. In the time since researchers began measuring trust in institutions, the press has gone from being one of the most trusted to one of the least trusted institutions in America. (See **Figure 2** in **Appendix A**.)

In attempting to understand this decline, much of the existing literature has found that the most significant predictor of trust in the press is political party identification (Pearl 2018; Ladd & Podkul 2019; Knight Foundation 2020). Historically, Democrats have reported significantly higher levels of trust in the press than Republicans do (Bump 2018; Brennan 2021). This partisan gap appears to have formed and grown as a

direct result of conservative attacks on the news media (Ladd & Podkul 2019).

While he was certainly not the first to do so, Donald Trump attacked the news media more regularly and with more hostility than any politician before him (Ladd & Podkul 2019). As candidate and then president, Donald Trump called for the harassment, prosecution, and even jailing of journalists. His constant attacks on the credibility of news media led to the term “fake news” being named the “official Collins Dictionary Word of the Year for 2017” (Meza 2017). As a result of Trump’s scathing attacks on the press, our fifth hypothesis is that **trust in the press will have fallen more among Republicans than among Democrats during the 2018-2021 period.**

Method

We use GSS data to measure several variables over time. We looked at Americans’ confidence in twelve social institutions: the military, the scientific community, medicine, education, the press, the executive branch of the federal government, congress, the U. S. Supreme Court, banks and other financial institutions, organized labor, major businesses, and organized religion. The GSS measures confidence in each of these institutions by respondents’ answers to the question:

“I am going to name some institutions in this country. As far as the people running these institutions are concerned, would you say you have a great deal of confidence, only some confidence, or hardly any confidence at all in them?”

And then the interviewer names a particular institution. As identified in the paragraph above, the institutions we focus on here are the “Military,” “The Scientific Community,” “Medicine,” “Education,” “The Press,” “The Executive Branch of the Federal Government,” “Congress,” “The United States Supreme Court,” “Banks and Other Financial Institutions,” “Major Businesses,” “Organized Labor,” and “Organized Religion.”

We looked at several ways of showing trends in the trust accorded to each of these institutions. In **Figures 1-12**, we present a series of graphs that show trends, from 1973 to 2021, in the percentage of respondents reporting they had “some” or “a great deal” of confidence in each social institution. An obvious problem with using GSS data to measure trends in trust or confidence in institutions is that one cannot be sure of what respondents are focused when they are asked their

confidence level in, say, “education” or “the press.” In general, many GSS items entail reliability issues (Hout and Hastings 2016). (**See Figures 1-12 in Appendix A.**)

Our central concern, however, is with whether changes in the levels of confidence in five of these institutions—the military, the scientific community, medicine, education and the press—between 2018 and 2021 differ for Republicans and Democrats. In this case, we recoded a variable that measured party identification in terms of eight categories—strong Democrat, not very strong Democrat, Independent (close to Democrat), Independent, Independent (close to Republican), not very strong Republican, Republican, other party—by combining the first three categories into a “Democrats” category and the fourth through seventh categories into a “Republican” category. **Tables 1** through **5** compare the changes in percentage of Republicans and Democrats who have confidence in each of our five institutions of concern between 2018 and 2021. (**See Tables 1-5 in Appendix B.**)

Findings

We now examine what happened to confidence in five institutions in the 2018 to 2021 period with special focus on what happened to confidence by party affiliation. **Figure 12** shows that this period involved the second greatest drop in confidence in the military (of 3.9 percent, from 93.3 percent of Americans saying they had some or a great deal of confidence in 2018 to 89.4 percent saying so in 2021) since September 11, 2001. And yet **Table 1**, in **Appendix B**, shows that this drop is partisan. Although there was indeed a *drop* of 4 percent among Democrats (from 91 percent who had “some” or “a great deal” of confidence in 2018 to 87 percent in 2021), confidence actually *rose* by 3.1 percent among Republicans (from 89.3 to 92.4 percent). This change presents support for our hypothesis that Democrats were in fact much more likely to lose confidence in the military during the 2018 to 2021 period than were Republicans.

Table 2 suggests a *slight drop* in the percentage of Americans who had “some” or “a great deal” of confidence in science between 2018 and 2021—from 93.6 to 92.8 percent. Here whether one chooses to measure confidence by combining those who had some and a great deal of confidence or just by using “a great deal” of confidence alone makes a difference. Because, when one looks just at those with “a great deal” of confidence, it appears there was a *slight increase* in the percentage who had confidence—from 45.3 percent who

had “a great deal” of confidence to 47.6. What matters from our point of view, however, is that, once again, is that regardless of how one measures confidence, there was a substantial partisan divide. Thus, for example, the percentage of Republicans who expressed “some” or “a great deal” of confidence in science dropped considerably—from 92.9 percent to 86.8 percent. However, the percentage of Democrats who expressed such confidence *rose* from 94.6 percent to 97.3 percent. (See Table 2 in Appendix B.)

Americans’ overall trust in medicine grew between 2018 and 2021. The percentage of Americans who had “some” or “a great deal” of trust in medicine was 87.6% in 2018; in 2021, it was 91%. Once again, party affiliation made a difference. While the percentage of Democrats who had trust *grew* from 87.8% in 2018 to 94.7% in 2021, the percentage of Republicans who had such trust *dropped* from 91.7% to 88.9%. (See Table 3 in Appendix B.)

The percentage of Americans who had “some” or “a great deal” of trust in education fell from 83.2% in 2018 to 79.2% in 2021. The partisan divide here was enormous, with the percentage of Democrats saying they were confident actually *increasing* by 4.6 % (from 83.6% to 88.2%) and the percentage of Republicans saying they were confident *dropping* by a whopping 12.7% (from 80.4% to 67.7%). (See Table 4 in Appendix B.)

The percentage of Americans reporting “at least some” trust in the press *dropped* from 54% in 2018 to 52.7% in 2021. There was already a huge partisan divide with regard to trust in the press in 2018: only 30.3% of Republicans had “at least some” confidence in it then, while 74.6% of Democrats did. The difference grew over the 2018-2021 period, with Republicans’ trust level *dropping* by 8% (to 22.3%) by 2021 and Democrats’ trust levels increasing by 5% (to 79.6%). (See Table 5 in Appendix B.)

CONCLUSION

We analyzed the GSS data over time and found general support for the broadly accepted view that Americans’ confidence in institutions declined over the past half century. Indeed, eight of the twelve institutions we examined did experience such a decline. In order, from the greatest to the least decline, these institutions were Congress, the press, the executive branch of government, education, religious organizations, financial institutions, major companies and medicine. We found that three institutions—science, the Supreme Court and organized labor—basically retained their

levels of public confidence over the period. And one institution—the military—actually enjoyed an increase in public trust.

Our principal finding, though, was of a substantial partisan divide when it came to changes in confidence between 2018 and 2021 in the military, science, medicine, education and the press—all institutions about which President Trump made substantial comment during his administration. When Republicans’ confidence *decreased*, Democrats’ confidence *increased*, and when Republicans’ confidence *increased*, Democrats’ confidence *decreased*. We attribute at least part of these differences to Trump’s expressed views about the institutions: when he bashed or merely criticized institutions—as he did science, medicine, public education and the press—Republican’s *lost confidence* in them, while Democrats experienced an *increase in confidence*; when he used (or threatened to use) an institution to do his bidding—as he did with the military—Republicans experienced an increase in confidence and Democrats experienced a decrease. Hence, our proposed modification of Levin’s thesis: that the public’s confidence in an institution *does not* simply reflect efforts on the part of insiders within those institutions. It can also reflect the observations made about an institution by charismatic leaders of other institutions: in this case, a President of the United States. It is of course possible that something other than former President Trump’s behavior contributed to the partisan divides described here. However, the divides themselves suggest that it is *not* good enough for insiders to behave in certain ways to improve (or diminish) trust in their institution; the people whom they might impress (or disappoint) will filter that behavior based on their own beliefs and dispositions and, while these beliefs and dispositions may be influenced by insider behavior, that behavior is hardly determinative.

There are limitations to our research. As we have already mentioned, research using data from the General Social Survey is somewhat limited by the fact that the question-wording is sometimes vague. How respondents interpret the question about confidence in institutions, for instance, will almost surely vary and likely affect the overall findings in unknowable ways. Another limitation is related to the timing of the surveys, especially the 2021 interviews. Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, the GSS was forced to change its methods and was unable to collect and release 2020 data. Instead of in-person interviews, the GSS was administered via the web for the first time in history, potentially skewing the results. The 2021 GSS ran from December 1, 2020, to

May 3, 2021. Donald Trump lost his bid for reelection in November 2020. Although the GSS is usually conducted during election years, it is not usually done so *after* the election. Due to the especially partisan nature of the 2020 election, it is likely that the timing of the survey had an (again unknowable) impact on the results. And, as is true of all available data, the GSS cannot be used to address issues one might be interested in but for which no data has been collected. Especially after the Presidential election of 2020 and Trump's claims that the election was stolen, for instance, it would have been fascinating to inspect partisan differences in change in confidence in the electoral system.

Nonetheless, our research casts strong doubt on the proposition that what insiders do *completely determines* how their institution will be perceived. Outsiders' perspectives are, of course, what really matters when it comes to trust, and these perspectives are not simply a function of insider behavior.

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Appendix A: Figures 1-12

Figure 1. "Some" or "a Great Deal" of Confidence in Congress Over Time




Figure 2. "Some" or "a Great Deal" of Confidence in the Press Over Time







Figure 3. "Some" or "a Great Deal" of Confidence in the Executive Branch of Government Over Time













Figure 12. “Some” or “a Great Deal” of Confidence in the Military Over Time



Appendix B. Tables 1-5

Table 1. Percentage of Americans¹ Who Have a “Great Deal” or “Only Some” Confidence in **Medicine**

Year	All Americans	Democrats	Republicans
2018	87.6	87.8	91.7
2021	91.0	94.7	88.9

¹These are Americans who declare a party affiliation only.

Table 2. Percentage of Americans¹ Who Have a “Great Deal” or “Only Some” Confidence in **the Scientific Community**

Year	All Americans	Democrats	Republicans
2018	93.6	94.6	92.9
2021	92.8	97.3	86.8

¹These are Americans who declare a party affiliation only.

Table 3. Percentage of Americans¹ Who Have a “Great Deal” or “Only Some” Confidence in **the Press**

Year	All Americans	Democrats	Republicans
2018	55.6	74.6	30.3
2021	52.4	79.7	22.3

¹These are Americans who declare a party affiliation only.

Table 4. Percentage of Americans¹ Who Have a “Great Deal” or “Only Some” Confidence in **the Military**

Year	All Americans	Democrats	Republicans
2018	93.3	91.0	89.3
2021	89.4	87.0	92.4

¹These are Americans who declare a party affiliation only.

Table 5. Percentage of Americans¹ Who Have a “Great Deal” or “Only Some” Confidence in **Education**

Year	All Americans	Democrats	Republicans
2018	83.2	83.6	80.4
2021	79.2	88.2	67.7

¹These are Americans who declare a party affiliation only.