GOYA, ORTEGA, AND MARTIN-SANTOS: INTERTEXTS

Marcia Welles
Barnard College

Fig. 1. *El aquelarre* (The Witches’ Sabbath) 1797-98. Madrid: Lázaro Galdiano Museum.
In a scene of central importance in Martín-Santos’s *Tiempo de silencio*, Goya’s painting, *El aquelarre* (the Witches’ Sabbath), provokes a negative assessment of Ortega y Gasset. It is my contention that the pictorial narrative is not merely a prop for the main scene of conflict: it is a full-fledged, though silent, *dramatis personae*, affecting both the dialogue and dialectic of the polemic.

The painting functions at two levels. At the primary level of narration, it is literally and quite explicitly an intertext, the intermediary through which Martín-Santos lays bare the weakness of the philosopher; at the secondary level of narration, the painting in turn ironically exposes a concealed subtext in Martín-Santos’s own fiction. Both as stated intertext and veiled intratext, its interpretive role is profound. These two levels are different: the overt tale is a masculine story of authority — its themes are history, power, and politics; the hidden story deals with the subversion of the rational order — it is about women (not “real” women, but their more potent sisters, women as perceived and imagined by men). Goya and Martín-Santos, both aware of the sinister aspects of life, recognize the disruptive power of the irrational and the inability to achieve a facile resolution between conflicting forces. Their voices blend across time and space to oppose the words of Him-who-poses-as-Master, Ortega y Gasset. The unsettling deconstruction of Ortega’s interpretive schema and the positing of a new set of questions in *Tiempo de silencio* are the subjects of this discussion, which begins — and ends — with Goya’s witches.

The Goya painting selected for commentary in *Tiempo de silencio* novel is one of a series of six commissioned by the Duke and Duchess of Osuna for their country house, the Alameda. Admittedly an aberration of the decorative conventions governing country house adornment, it is thought to have been inspired by Leandro Fernández de Moratín’s edition (with commentaries) of the 1610 Logroño inquisitorial proceedings, where witchcraft and superstition are mocked in accordance with the dictates of the spirit of the Enlightenment. If there is a correlation between Goya’s painting and Moratín’s essay, it is to be found in the vivid testimony of the *Auto de fe*, rather than in the cynical and jesting disparagements of Moratín. In *El aquelarre*, the focus is on the crowned he-goat Devil glorying in his power, rather than on the ghastly hags of the *Caprichos* or the ghoulish and deformed worshipers of the *aquelarre* scene of the *Pinturas negras*, *El gran cabrón* (The Great He-Goat). This corresponds to the testimony of the proceedings, which describes the Devil-figure as seated with “majestad y gravedad” (618), specifying that “los ojos tiene redondos, grandes, muy abiertos, encendidos y espantosos” (619), and depicts him extending his left hand to “mark” a worshipper:
Y luego el demonio tiende la mano izquierda, y bajándose por la cabeza hacia el hombro izquierdo ó en otras diferentes partes del cuerpo (según que á él le parezca), le hace una marca, hincándole una de sus uñas... (619).

Goya actualizes one of the most common charges leveled against witches — the ritual murder and sacrifice of children — by means of blood-sucking or suffocation, according to the Auto (629-30).

*El aquelarre* appears in the novel in a singularly abrupt manner, as startling to the reader as it is to the main protagonist, Pedro, when he confronts the reproduction on the rose-colored wall. Its intrusion in the narration is as discordant as the location of the painting in its setting: unlike the “weird sisters” of *Macbeth* who appear on the wild Scottish heath, these “secret, black, and midnight hags” (4.1.49) are found amidst the refined Empire-style decor of a wealthy Madrid apartment.

The author does not leave the reader puzzled for long, however, for he quickly establishes an explicit satirical link between text and image. By juxtaposing and eventually conflating the description of the painting with a description of a lecture delivered by Ortega y Gasset, he succeeds in identifying the figure of the satanic goat with that of the philosopher. Like the “grand Bouc,” Ortega is giving his own command performance for the elite audience at the Barceló theatre in Madrid — a discourse on perspectivism facilitated by a contemplation on the quiddity (or essential nature) of the humble apple. This is a memorable and outrageous metaphor based on a specious resemblance of posture, humorous because it reduces the human to the bestial. It is comparable to Goya’s own satirical technique of animalization, as used in the “Ass sequence” of the *Caprichos* “in which those animals assume the role of dilettante, doctors, teachers and nobles.”

This scene of Ortegean satire and parodic ridiculization has merited the lucid attention of two critics in particular: Alfonso Rey identifies as the targets of Martín-Santos’s polemic Ortega’s practice of philosophy (directed to the exclusive, cultured group that participated in the “Instituto de Humanidades” lectures referred to here) as well as his political theory, particularly as presented in *España invertebrada* with its historical diagnosis of the alleged degeneracy of the Visigothic inheritance of Spain and the resulting feudal weakness and lack of an exemplary ruling minority, which Martín-Santos ironically incorporates in the allusion to the “sangre visigótica enmhecida” [129]); Betty Jean Craige, by means of a finely wrought stylistic appraisal, considers the juxtaposition of painting and lecture “as a kind of emblem for the perversion of instinct and intellect” that constitutes the main theme of the novel.

We must beware that the explicitness of the parodic satire does not blind us to other implicit associations woven in the text. The comic identification of man and beast is not an end, but a beginning, the nucleus from which develops a far more complex metaphorical field. As a pebble thrown in water, ever larger
circles of meaning emanate from this center, with repercussions felt at the specific textual level and at the general contextual level.

When Pedro, the protagonist of the novel, first notices the reproduction of Goya’s painting, he exclaims ¡Déjame mirarlo!” and then quickly adds “Casi no me atrevo” (127). As readers we ask ourselves “Why?” Of what is he afraid?” His reaction is not motivated by external factors (this is, in fact, one of the prettiest of Goya’s witch paintings — the colors are bright and light permeates the scene): his sense of dread corresponds rather to that range of feelings classified by Freud as reactions to the “uncanny.” Described as a specific form of fear, characterized by involuntary repetition and helplessness, this anxiety “can be shown to come from something repressed which recurs”: it is “something which ought to have been kept concealed but which has nevertheless come to light.” The explicit link may be comic, but it is not anxiety-provoking. We must probe further.

It is my contention that we will never discover the cause of Pedro’s fear unless we confront the implications of one word used in the description of the painting — auparishtaka. The insight of the critics has illuminated important coincidences between painter and author; resistance to this simple word constitutes an equally significant critical blind spot. To ignore the reading that this term elicits is to contribute to the history of silence and repression best exemplified in the English translation by George Leeson, who omits the term altogether. An interpretation, according to one of its dictionary definitions, is an “explanation of what is not immediately plain or explicit.” Martín-Santos’s critical understanding of Goya is far removed from an aesthetic, coolly formalist appreciation; on the contrary, it is a veritable delirium fraught with psychological and ideological excitement. As second-removed interpreters of Martín-Santos’s interpretation of Goya, we, the readers, must practice Freud’s recommended technique of an “evenly-hovering attention,” and allow every word its full import. Auparishtaka, transcribed as it is in a little-known foreign tongue, has already undergone conscious censorship: this should alert us to further attentiveness, not to disregard and an unconscious censorship on our part.

Let us begin by completing the analogy. If, as Martín-Santos suggests, the philosopher is like the “grand Bouc,” then the elegantly dressed ladies (each is described as “Balenciagamente vestida” [132]), these “culture vultures” surrounding the lecturer, are like the worshiping witches encircling the he-goat: women gathered in reverential awe of the great master. In a bold and hyperbolic act of interpretation, Martín-Santos characterizes the posture of Goya’s witches by means of a trope: “en ademán de auparishtaka” (127), an unusual Sanskrit term referring to fellatio, gleaned, one would assume, from the Indian book of love, the Kama Sutra, whose purported author, Vatsyayana, is mentioned subsequently. The preference for the Sanskrit over the Latin word is due, at least in part, to censorship precautions, and is fully justified by allusions later
in the passage to the erotic temple art of India (in Elephanta and Bhunaveśvara), the point of origin of the hordes of Spanish gypsies.

Is this a misreading of Goya? Possibly, but it does not perforce constitute a misunderstanding. On the contrary, it is a profoundly revealing insight, which by disclosing the full meaning to Goya’s witches provides us with a clue to the hidden, unconscious source of Pedro’s fear. It is our mode of access to the latent level of irrationality that exerts pressure on the rational, surface level of narration of both painting and novel.

Witchcraft was one of the many superstitions in the process of being belittled by the rationalist ilustrado ideology, but the sinister quality of Goya’s witch paintings belies a purely detached, intellectual intent. In the words of Caro Baroja:

No one who looks at the works of Goya today can believe that they were the product of the cold analysis of human affairs we find in his contemporaries, Jovellanos and Moratín, concerned to root out bad legal practices, corrupt political institutions and out-of-date beliefs.¹²

No one, including Pedro, can react to Goya’s witches with the superiority of laughter, but rather with the vulnerability of dread, fearful of an undefined and impending evil.

In spite of the dictates of reason, the accumulated folklore and literary tradition of Goya’s day had duly empowered the witches’ sabbath as a powerful symbol of sin and degradation. The etymology, in fact, demonstrates these connotations: “sabbath” is related to the Hebrew Sabbath, synonymous in the Middle Ages with ignominy,¹³ and aquelarre derives from the Basque word akerra meaning he-goat,¹⁴ the symbol of lasciviousness.¹⁵ These were nocturnal meetings, usually held in deserted places away from the confines of civilized society (aquelarre or akelarre in Basque, an amalgam of the word for he-goat and larre, larra: field, means literally “the field or plain of the he-goat”).¹⁶

Since the publication in 1486 (?) of the canon of witchcraft, the Malleus Maleficarum (the “Hammer Against the Witches”), orgiastic sexual practices were considered an indispensable feature of the aquelarre. These include acts of incest, pedophilia, homosexuality, but the necessary feature was intercourse with the Devil. In fact:

The sexual act between the demon and the witch also bound the witch to his service in a magical way, while she gained from it an increase in the potency of her supernormal powers. The coition was an essential part of the pact between the two, and some held that in essence it was the pact, with the additional ceremonies, oath-taking, etc., no more than mere trappings and folderol.¹⁷
As recounted in the Logroño document: “Luego que el demonio acaba su misa, los conoce á todos, hombres y mujeres, carnal y sométicamente” (625). Ever potent, in the words of Martín-Santos, in his “glorioso dominio fálico. En el que tener dos cuernos no es sino reduplicación de la potencia” (127), the Devil is the ideal lover, or, put more crudely, the “Prince of Fornicators,” whose penetrating eye (a parody of the disguised wolf’s eyes of “Little Red Riding Hood”) keeps watch on the dangling foetuses and recumbent bodies sprawled around him.

Although there were male witches (warlocks) and these are depicted by Goya, the great majority of witches were women. The gynecophobic inquisitors Kramer and Sprenger, authors of the *Malleus*, offer the following explanation for this phenomenon:

All witchcraft comes from carnal lust, which is in women insatiable. See *Proverbs* XXX: There are three things that are never satisfied, yea, a fourth thing which says not, It is enough; that is, the mouth of the womb. Wherefore for the sake of fulfilling their lusts they consort even with devils... And blessed be the Highest Who has so far preserved the male sex from so great a crime: for since He was willing to be born and to suffer for us, therefore He has granted to men this privilege.19

The shared etymological root of *mater* and *materia* seems to have exerted an archaic pull on inquisitors and Church fathers alike, who identified woman as flesh. Object of desire and damnation, she wielded terrible powers, and man's confrontation with the feminine was filled with dread — of her unique generative power, of her overwhelming sexual demands. The witch in particular became the embodiment of sexual evil.

Many calamities of nature were attributed to the witch, but her magical powers were exercised primarily upon “women’s things” — reproductive and sexual acts such as abortions, miscarriages, stillbirths, the poisoning of infants’ milk, sterility:

But the sexual magic of witches in which the authorities took the greatest interest was *ligature*, or the production of impotence by magical means. It seems apparent that the fear of impotence was widespread.... 50

The *Malleus* actually questions whether a witch can steal the male organ: “can with the help of devils really and actually remove the member, or whether they only do so apparently by some glamour or illusion.” 21 The derivation of the fear of witches is here unmasked as the dread of castration.

If we turn our attention from this particular circle configuration, the “adoración centrípeta” (127) of the witches as described by Martín-Santos, and look at other circles of women in Goya’s folk play scenes, such as the earlier tapestry cartoon, *El pelele* (The Straw Maniquin, 1791-92), or the later etching
from the Disparates (ca. 1815-24), the Disparate femenino (Feminine Folly [Fig. 2]), we appreciate how threatening a spatial configuration it is:

The enclosing ring of women reduces man to the inert, castrated figures of puppet and mule, Indeed, the power of women, felt in their sexual potency from youthful glances to the horrific decrepitude of shriveled bosoms, constitutes one of Goya’s primal obsessions.22

![Disparate femenino (Feminine Folly) ca. 1815-24.](image)

The same primal anxiety informs other aspects of Goya’s production. The intent of the Caprichos as stated in the first advertisement (Diario de Madrid, 6 February 1799) was “la censura de los errores y vicios humanos,” choosing from the vast array “aquellos que ha creído más aptos a subministrar materia para el ridículo, y exercitar al mismo tiempo la fantasía del artifice.”23 Goya’s ameliorative mission was best served, apparently, by unmasking the frailties and deceits of women, much like his predecessor, that master of satire, Quevedo. Capricho 20 “Ya van desplumados” (“There they go plucked”), for example, depicts prostitutes (“hens”) in a hen pen, driving out their “fleeced” customers, and serves as an indictment of women’s ruthless exploitation of men’s sexuality. As one critic writes:
In a sense the sexual satires are central to the *Caprichos*: their spirit drenches the collection. Woman frequently figures as the vehicle of that corruption and unreason which is making a grotesque tragi-farce out of Spanish society presided over by Queen Maria Luisa and her cortejo Godoy.\(^\text{24}\)

If, according to Freud, “A person may be made comical in order to render him contemptible or in order to deprive him of his claims to dignity and authority,”\(^\text{25}\) the comic pleasure derived from the satire of women can be seen as a means of minimizing the power of women: it creates, albeit temporarily, a fantasy of omnipotence that wards off anxiety.\(^\text{26}\) Goya’s perception of woman is best exemplified in the etching *Disparate desenfrenado* (Unbridled Folly), which, especially in view of the “enigmatic smile” of the female, has been interpreted by Joan Owen as a statement of “woman’s envelopment in phallic passion (Fig. 3).\(^\text{27}\)

![Image of Disparate desenfrenado](Plate 10 [Disparate desenfrenado] (Unbridled Folly) ca. 1815-24.)

Martín-Santos’s metaphor of *auparishtaka* has provided the mode of access to the latent level of Goya’s painting, disclosing a psychological subtext, which, in obsessive fashion, is repeated in other works of the painter. The protagonist (*cum narrator, cum author*)\(^\text{28}\) has thus submitted Goya to his presumption of knowledge, by discovering the “truth” of Goya’s witches. But the analyst/analysand situation is relational, and Pedro’s interpretation of the
witch painting in turn elicits and reveals his own story, disclosing in the novel subtexts beyond the immediate, conscious control of the narrative voice.

Describing the auparishtákicas-turned-society-ladies in attendance at the philosophical evening, the narrator vents his general depreciation of women: “Las mujeres se precipitan; son las mujeres que se precipitan a escuchar la verdad. Precisamente aquéllas a quienes la verdad deja completamente indiferentes” (128). No less vehemently than the inquisitors of the Malleus, the narrator condemns the female sex to the world of flesh; their efforts to incorporate the male domain of the intellect can be nothing but fraudulent and repugnant: “La quiddidad de la manzana quedará mostrada ante las mujeres a las que la quiddidad indiferencia. ¡Vayamos con las mujeres inquietas, con las mujeres finas, con las mujeres de la selección hacia el inspirado discurso!” (128). Here Martín-Santos echoes Nietzsche, according to whom woman is restless — “Thus man wishes woman to be peaceable: but in fact woman is essentially unpeaceable, like the cat, however well she may have assumed the peaceable demeanor” — and she is by nature a skeptic:

But she does not want truth — what does woman care for truth? From the very first nothing is more foreign, more repugnant, or more hostile to woman than truth — her great art is falsehood, her chief concern is appearance and beauty.29

It is true that in their critique of phallocentrism Derrida and others have denied the alleged misogyny of Nietzsche, interpreting his view of “woman” as positive, as a rejection of the privileged status of Truth in the (male) Western metaphysical tradition.30 In spite of this, there can be no doubt that the intent of Martín-Santos’s use of Nietzsche’s images is not celebratory.

The bitterness is not unmotivated. At the time that he makes this comment, Pedro has already fallen, literally and figuratively, into the trap set for him by the so-called “tres diosas” (37), the female triumvirate of grandmother, mother, daughter Dorita, owners of the boarding house where he lives. He has succumbed to female temptation and has made love to Dorita, who therefore must become his “lawful wedded wife,” irrespective of the social and educational gulf that divides the two. Though these three women have been associated with Calypso and Penelope,31 they are called “las tres parcas” (41). Perhaps not as gruesome as Goya’s evocation of the Fates in the Pinturas negras, they are as determinative in fixing the “hero’s” destiny, and seal his spiritual, if not physical death (Fig. 4).
The witch-like Fates in Goya’s painting hold in their clutches a captive male figure, “priapismic” in gesture and appearance, whose expression conveys “unthinking and unreasoning capitulation to aberrant powers and direction”.

Pedro is equally accursed. Intercourse with Dorita has not been an act of love — “Si yo creo que el amor ha de ser conciencia, claridad, luz, conocimiento” (98) — but an act of bestiality. Pedro compares himself to an animal in heat — “Yo también, puesto en celo, calentado pródigo como las ratonas del Muecas, acariciado de putas, mimado de viejas...” (99), to a cock crowing in victory — “como un gallo encaramado en lo alto de una tapia que lanza su kikiriki estridente...” (98). Pedro’s personal fall was followed rapidly by his professional fall, when he was called to the slum suburbs of Madrid, to the failed abortion and death of Florita, a victim of incest. As his personal project has collapsed before the “exuberancia elemental y cíclica” (95) of Dorita, so too are his scientific skills to no avail when he confronts the dying female, Florita: this “fabricante de la futura ciencia” (103) can do nothing to stop “la abundancia insólita y alarmante de la pérdida de sangre” (101) as he uselessly scrapes her inner concavities.

This has been called a novel of failure, and so it is. Though cleared from the wrongful accusation of Florita’s death, the scandal proved fatal to his career.
Pedro’s dreams of glory as a medical researcher of cancer are forcibly terminated, and he joins the humble ranks of the provincial practitioners.

He is a castrated man, without power or effectiveness: “Es cómodo ser eunuco, es tranquilo, estar desprovisto de testículos, es agradable a pesar de estar castrado tomar el aire y el sol mientras uno se amoje ma en silencio” (238). The allusion to the myth of the *vagina dentata* is not accidental: “Osado el que penetra en la carne femenina, ¿como podrá permanecer entero tras la cópula? Vagina dentata, castración afectiva, emasculación posesiva...” (161). The female, not the male, has proven the effective agent of castration.35

It is worthwhile noting that in Martín-Santos’s unfinished *Tiempo de destrucción* the main character, another male protagonist, Agustín, confronts the problem of impotence. As he imagines the act of intercourse, he conjures up visions of the fearful Medusa, the symbol of horror in Greek mythology that Freud links directly to the fear of castration occasioned by the sight of the “incomplete” sex of the mother.36 Increasingly “Goyesque” in his vision, the novelist incorporates an *aquelarre* scene, in which a disquisition on women’s sexuality ends with a repulsive image comparing female sexual organs to bats: “los murciélagos tóxicos y pellejosos que sus órganos recuerdan” (462).37 The dread inspired by female genitalia is specifically cited by Freud as an example confirming his theory of the uncanny:

> It often happens that male patients declare that they feel there is something uncanny about the female genital organs. This *unheimlich* place, however, is the entrance to the former *heim* [home] of all human beings, to the place where everyone dwelt once upon a time and in the beginning.... In this case, too, the *unheimlich* is what was once *heimisch*, home-like, familiar; the prefix ‘un’ is the token of repression. (398-99)

In *Tiempo de silencio* female blood (virginal in Dorita, foetal in Florita) and female coposes (both women die) form part of the cluster of defilement of bodily substances — blood, semen, excrement — for which the neologism *magma* is created in the conversation with the German neo-expressionist painter. Defined only by means of examples, among which are sperm and molten rock (75), one can conclude that it is another bodily discharge: “A kind of supersemen or bionic dung, it can only be named by recourse to such words as ‘pregnante,’ ‘protoforma,’ ‘vitalidad.’”38 In terms of the existentialist dialectic between facticity and transcendence, Pedro, unable to heed his own advice that “No debe caer en esta flor entreabierta como una mosca y pringarse las patitas” (95), becomes engulfed in the viscosity of facticity.39

Goya and Martín-Santos wage a common battle. As desperately as surgeons trying to excise the dizzying proliferation of cancer cells destroying the sick human body as well as the ailing body politic, they try to define, and make tangible, the evils of abjection, defined as follows:
It is thus no lack of cleanliness or health that causes abjection but what disturbs identity, system, order. What does not respect borders, positions, rules. The in-between, the ambiguous, the composite.\(^{40}\)

In Goya and Martín-Santos women as witches are a powerful metonymic expression of abjection, broadly conceived as anti-structure, as the irrational forces that threaten the rational and symbolic structures form the potent subterranean depths of the human psyche. In his psychiatric/philosophical writing, Martín-Santos defines the contrast between the “actitud ética” and the “norma objetal”; the former is defined as “consciente, reflexiva, elaborada y lingüística”; the latters as “inconsciente, automática, elemental y simbólica.”\(^{41}\)

The battle between intellectuality and sexuality, between the realm of the metaphysical and that of the physical, is a formidable one. “Porque en Elefanta el templo y en Bhuvaneshwara la infancia inmisericordemente de hambre perecía, pero fue en tales templos grande la adoración a los ritos que acerca de la naturaleza siempre madre — y tan amamantadora — describiera Vatsyayana...” (128): thus Martín-Santos evokes the ancient roots of Spanish popular culture — gypsies, bullfighters, bandits, and prostitutes, all of whom are “siluetas de Elefanta” (129). The Iberians remain bound to their ancient roots, to India and its belief in the sacred nature of sexuality, its continuing cult of the pre-Aryan Great Goddess or Great Mother who, worshiped in sexual union with her divine consort Shiva, has many names and forms, and whose ambivalent nature is both positive and negative (the latter represented, for example, by the destructive Kali, “The Dark One”):

The Goddess and her God, together, represent the cosmic female and male whose eternal embrace procreates the universe and its creatures, keeping the life-processes of the world in operation. The most archaic representations of their union are not in the human forms of male and female divinities, but in simple sexual symbols: cone-shaped or phallic erect stones, denoting the male, and circular stones with a hollow center, representing the female.\(^{42}\)

These icons (the lingam and the yoni respectively) are the chief cult images of the Shiva temple on the island of Elephanta and of the main temple (Lingarāja) and Bhunavesvara.\(^{43}\)

The Great Goddess, in her positive, nourishing aspect as well as her negative Terrible Mother aspect, is the source of life as well as death: a person’s destiny is in her control. Pedro is no less a victim of the domination of this primordial archetype, in both its negative and positive manifestations: the young women, Dorita (deliberately) and Florita (unintentionally) perform negative functions as “young witch” figures who, appropriately ensnaring their prey while he is in a drunken stupor and therefore in a state of lessened consciousness, hasten the disintegration of the personality into a state characterized by “madness, impotence, stupor.”\(^{44}\)
If they bring him death, so does another woman restore his life: it is the very humble wife of Muecas who saves him from a murder charge, a fact which Gonzalo Sobejano has stressed to counter the allegations of elitism leveled at Martín-Santos. In addition to class considerations, however, there are also those of gender to consider. The insistence on her roundness and shapelessness ("la redonda consorte" [134]), on her lack of intellectuality or self-reflexive consciousness ("Y repetir obstinadamente: 'El no fue'. No por amor a la verdad, ni por amor a la decencia, ni porque pensara que al hablar así cumplia con su deber..." [202] identify the maternal elementary character that defines her. Reminiscent of the corpulent stone figures of the Great Mother of the prehistoric era, Muecas’s wife is a positive “Good Mother” type, fertile, nourishing, and protecting. Her goodness arises, literally, from the archaic depths of her being. (Noticeably absent from the manifestations of the archetypal Feminine in Tiempo de silencio are inspirational figures, whose functions include “wisdom” and “vision.”)

In their rendering of the struggle between reason and unreason, both painter and author retain the traditional male/female gender division, using woman as the metaphor for that which threatens order and purpose and destabilizes the social fabric. This polarity explored in their fictions has an equivalent sociopolitical articulation. In Goya it is defined in the ilustrado/castizo dichotomy, precipitated by the French Revolution and the Napoleonic invasion, exacerbated by Ferdinand VII’s betrayal of the Caroline Enlightenment: “The tension was that between ‘Reason’ with a French accent and ‘tradition’ increasingly interpreted in populist and folklorist terms — the peculiar Spanish liberty.” One can add, between reason and the unreason of atavistic passions unleashed by the horrors of war. Martín-Santos, writing from the mediocrity of the benighted Franco era, acutely etches the dilemma of the “Two Spains” in Tiempo de silencio — one portion aspiring to the Nobel Prize ("galardón nórdico" [7]), to the rationality of science and technology of the North; the other immersed in the squalor of the bajo pueblo, exemplified by the Andalusian gypsies or the squalor of the Madrid suburbs.

As witchcraft was one of the many superstitions that the Enlightenment philosophy sought to extirpate, Goya’s painting pointedly recalls the afrancesado-tradicionalista scission that tore asunder the optimistic aspirations of the earlier years of the Bourbon regime. In Tiempo de silencio the painting elicits a parodic, highly polemical discourse, the target of which is the eighteenth-century version of this eighteenth-century split: the so-called “problem of Spain” debate to which Ortega was a main contributor. His consistent call for the “Europeización” (some would say “Germanization”) of Spain as a means of salvation from the national ills pitted him against the older Unamuno, for example, who had recanted his earlier reformist position and rejected the scientism of the North. Both positions are negated in Tiempo de silencio: Unamuno’s spiritualistic myth of the Iberian man is also incorporated ironically
by Martín-Santos in the phrase glorifying the common masses as “vestidos únicamente de gracia y no de la repulsiva técnica del noroeste” (129), which echoes Ortega’s own rejection of a kind of patriotism that is “inactivo, espectacular, extático,” characterized by empty praises of “Las glorias más o menos legendarias de nuestra raza en tiempos pretéritos, la belleza del cielo, el garbo de las mujeres, la chispa de los hombres que hallamos en torno nuestro...”

The subsequent deformed rendition of Ortega’s lecture on perspectivism has ideological, as well as personal (ad-hominem) implications: Ortega’s interest in the Cervantean perspective forms an integral part of his national goals: the philosopher alerts us that, at the heart of the Meditaciones del Quijote (1914), can be heard “los latidos de la preocupación patriótica.” In his contrast between Mediterranean “impressionism” and Northern “ideality,” Ortega states unequivocally that “una cultura impresionista está condenada a no ser una cultura progresiva” (354); the salvation of Spain lies in the incorporation of the categorical level of ideation, for “Sólo la visión mediante el concepto es una visión completa” (354). Martín-Santos mockingly alludes to this ontological solution in the description of the lecturer: “y entonces indicas como triaca magna y terapéutica que a la gran Germania nutricia, Harzhessen de brujas y de bucos, hay que fenomenológicamente incorporar” (130).

It is precisely this Spanish/Germanic dichotomy that merits Martín-Santos’s most bitter derision. In all fairness it must be stated that Ortega’s “genetic account of racial differences in ideational ability” (as Philip Silver has aptly described it) assumed the possibility of attaining a higher consciousness through education (“Por la educación obtendremos de un individuo imperfecto un hombre cuyo pecho resplandece en irradiaciones virtuosas”). Nevertheless, in Meditaciones del Quijote Ortega’s characterization of the typical Spaniard’s (as opposed to his own) way of seeing acquires lurid overtones:

¿Por qué el español se obstina en vivir anacrónicamente consigo mismo? ¿Por qué se olvida de su herencia germánica? Sin ella — no haya duda — padecería un destino equivocado. Detrás de las facciones mediterráneas parece esconderse el gesto asiático o africano, y en éste — en los ojos, en los labios asiáticos o africanos — yace como sólo adormecida la bestia infrahumana, presta a invadir la entera fisonomía.

Y hay en mí una substancial, cósmica aspiración a levantarmene de la fiera como de un lecho sangriento. (356-57)

In all likelihood it is this kind of sensationalistic prose, rather than the more restrained analytical references to the epochs of Kitra and Kali in España invertebrada, that provokes Martín-Santos’s parodic development of the theme of India in his unweaving of Ortega’s brilliant, but fragile, threads of argumentation.

In his polemic with Ortega, Martín-Santos has exposed a paradoxical flaw in the tissues of his text. Ortega has been called “a leader of the cultural optimists
and ethical radicals”; his politics defined as one “of pure spirit, not the politics of gross national product.”54 An existentialist in his definition of life as projective futurity (“eso que llaman su vida no es sino afán de realizar un determinado proyecto o programa de existencia”)55 and his unyielding belief in the individual’s possibility (and responsibility) of transcendence, Ortega nevertheless denied the negative concerns of anguish and death prevalent in other existentialist writers.56

His will to optimism (which Martín-Santos sees also as a “will to power”) was such that he resisted any suggested limitations on an individual’s freedom. This accounts for both his rejection of dialectical materialism and his discomfort with Freud’s concept of unconscious motivation: both were too mechanistic:

Hay un extraño empeño en mostrar que el Universo es un absoluto quid pro quo, una inepcia constitutiva. El moralista procurará insinuarnos que todo altruismo es un larvado egoísmo. Darwin describirá pacientemente la obra modeladora que la muerte realiza en la vida y hará de la lucha por la existencia el máximo poder vital. Parejamente, Carlos Marx pondrá en la raíz de la historia la lucha de clases.57

Paradoxically, however, Ortega’s historical analysis of the etiology of Spanish decadence, which includes the “sangre visigoda enmohecida” of España invertebrada and the asiatic origins alluded to in Meditaciones del Quijote, hints at a biological determinism much more devastating in its implications: unlike environmental factors, genetic determinants cannot be ameliorated. Martín-Santos detects this unwelcome conclusion to Ortega’s national diagnosis and develops it to grotesque proportions — with deliberate satirical intent:

Y este ser tontos no tiene remedio. Porque no bastará ya nunca que la gente estatonta pueda comer, ni pueda ser vestida, ni pueda ser piadosamente educada en luminosas naves de nueva planta construida, ni pueda ser selectamente nutrida... puesto que víctimas de su sangre gótica de mala calidad y de bajo puedo mediterráneo permanecerán adheridos a sus estructuras asiáticas.... (129)

Martín-Santos’s hyperbole has a devastating effect. As Freud before him had injuriously defined woman’s sexuality by her lack-of the male organ, thus imprisoning her within a congenital deficiency,58 so Ortega’s analysis relegates Spain to a position of constitutional deficiency vis-à-vis Europe (Germany). By allegorical extension, the phallic celebration by Goya’s witches (the powerless) of the Buco (the power-ful) becomes Spain’s adulation of the potent North. Martín-Santos, via El aquelarre, disarticulates the corpus of Ortega’s diagnosis of Spain’s ills, but does not pose a solution. As ambiguous and detached as Goya59, his ironic consciousness is too acute to offer a harmonious resolution to such deep-seated personal and national problems.60 In his rejection
of Ortega’s idealism, however, he does place emphasis on exactly those factors that the philosopher has excluded (or repressed?, we may well ask). Such economic determinants as the dryness of the earth and the harshness of the climate loom large in the novel, as do the “haunts of wretchedness and need” (as described in a hymn), where the victims of this inhospitable land live and die.\textsuperscript{61}

Equally manifest are the latent irrational and instinctive forces, in particular the sexual drive, that confuse, distort, and eventually annihilate man’s project—his life, in effect. (I use the word “man” deliberately, as no woman is portrayed as having an existential project; she remains bound to her biological imperative of reproduction.)

Disconcertingly, the texts by painter, philosopher, and novelist do converge on one point: their view of the role of woman. Goya and Martín-Santos conceptualize woman as a malefic force that undermines the rational, civilizing powers of man; they feel threatened by her and fear her power. Although Ortega admits no danger and betrays no panic, he (rather playfully) relegates woman to the same position as “The Underminer.” In his \textit{Estudios sobre el amor} Ortega analyzes the phenomenon of love in his customarily exalted way as a desire for perfection, but remains puzzled by the process of selection: the worst, not the best, seem to be the preferred objects of choice.\textsuperscript{62} He attributes this to woman’s staunch lack of interest in outstanding qualities, her consistent preference for mediocrity (“Tyende más bien a eliminar los individuos mejores, masculinamente hablando, a los que innovan y emprenden altas empresas, y manifiesta un decidido entusiasmo por la mediocridad” [626]). He takes comfort in the mystery of the ways of nature, and muses further:

¿Quién sabe si a la postre conviene este despegue de la mujer hacia lo mejor? Tal vez su papel en la mecánica de la historia es ser una fuerza retardataria frente a la turbulenta inquietud, al afán de cambio y avance que brota del alma masculina. (626)

This time in the guise of a charming seductress, the female witch once again calls man back to earth, reminding him of his body, his mortality, “resuelta... a procurar que el hombre no llegue nunca a ser semidiós o arcángel” (626).

\textbf{NOTES}


6 *Construcción y sentido de “Tiempo de silencio”* (Madrid: Porrúa, 1977) in particular 227-34.

7 All quotes refer to the 3rd ed. (Barcelona: Seix Barral, 1966) and will be incorporated in the text. The English trans. by George Leeson appears as *Time of Silence* (New York: Harcourt, 1964).


11 My thanks are due to the late Barbara S. Miller, Professor of Oriental Studies, for her help with the Sanskrit terms in the text. In the English trans. by Sir Richard F. Burton (New York: Dutton, 1962) pt. 2, chap. 9, is entitled "On the Auparishtaka, or Mouth Congress."


13 Caro Baroja, 88.

14 Ibid., 147.

15 Ibid., 273, n. 21.

16 Ibid., 160.


18 Ibid., 168.


20 Masters, 128-29 (italics in original).

21 Part I, question 9, 58.


27 "Reading Goya's Disparates," 388.

28 The relationship among the three entities is problematic; they are difficult, if not impossible to distinguish. For a study of the use of interior monologue in the novel, see Carmen de Zulueta, "El monólogo interior de Pedro en Tiempo de silencio," *Hispanic Review* 45 (Summer 1977): 297-309.


33 Gemma Roberts, *Temas existenciales en la novela española de postguerra* (Madrid:

34 Carlos Feal Deibe, “Consideraciones sicoanalíticas sobre Tiempo de silencio de Martín-Santos,” Revista Hispánica Moderna 36, no. 3 (1970-71): 127 (“Agudamente el protagonista percibe su situación final como equivalente a una castración.”) Craige considers Pedro’s “final impotence” the result of the “separation of instinct and intellect,” and points out the stylistic manifestations of this theme (101-02).


36 In “Medusa’s Head” (written 1922, publ. 1940). See Kofman, The Engima of Woman (n. 30), 82-89 for a discussion of this text.

37 References are to the ed. of José Carlos Mainer (Barcelona: Seix Barral, 1975), and will be incorporated in the text.


39 Roberts, in particular 168-74, “Lo viscoso: símbolo de la nausea.” See also “El sexo y el amor,” 161-67. See also discussion in Rey (167-81) on role of love in the novel.


41 Libertad, temporalidad y transferencia en el psicoanálisis existencial (Barcelona: Seix Barral, 1964) 84-85.


43 For descriptions of temples see Zimmer, 1: 297-98, 2: Plates 248-65 (Elephanta) and 1: 273, 2: Plate 329 (Liñgaraja).


46 See Neumann, ch. 10, “The Positive Elementary Character”: “At the center of the feminine elementary character in which the woman contains and protects, nourishes and gives birth, stands the vessel, which is both attribute and symbol of the feminine nature” (120). In the representations, the breasts and belly acquire special predominance. For a structural diagram of the manifestations and functions of the Archetypal Feminine see Schema III, facing p. 82.

47 Williams, 28.

48 For Unamuno’s change of position for that expressed in En torno al casticismo (written as separate essays in 1895) see in particular his “Sobre la europeización” (1906). The Vida de Don Quijote y Sancho (1905) is another key indicator of Unamuno’s
“conversion.” For a succinct account see José Luis Aranguren’s prologue (9-44) in the Antología of Unamuno’s works (Madrid: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1964). Humberto Piñera, Unamuno y Ortega y Gasset: contraste de dos pensadores (México: Centro de Estudios Humanísticos de La Univ. de Nuevo Léon, 1965) compares their views on “modernization” and “Europeization” (112-17).


50 Obras completas, 1: 328 (subsequent references incorporated in the text).


52 “La pedagogía social como programa político,” p. 508.


In his study of El idealismo político de Ortega y Gasset (Madrid: Edicusa, 1974) Javier F. Lalcona writes that:

Entre las carencias fundamentales que aparecen en el pensar político orteguiano se encuentra la consideración económica del problema político. La aportación fundamental del sistema marxista... no se encuentra en Ortega. Es fácil advertir en él su repugnancia por la interpretación económica de la historia. (364)

Lalcona concludes that “El programa político de Ortega era esencialmente ético: la transformación del hombre masificado en hombre personal, la transformación del corrompido carácter español en otro más perfecto y más puro” (367), noting that Ortega nowhere diagnosed the socioeconomic conditions governing the differences of class and environment that so affect the possibilities of change.
In her analysis of the contradiction in Freud’s though, Kofman shows how Freud, in contradistinction to his earlier observations (such as “On Narcissism” [1914]), focused in his later writings (such as “Female Sexuality” [1931] and “Femininity” [1933]) on woman’s “castration complex,” her perceived biological inferiority and its effects: “as the decisive factor that accounts for all the differences, ‘penis envy’ wins out over every other; the monism of the explanation, its singleminded focus on a single idea, turns it into a delirious speculation. ‘Penis envy’ is, after all, Freud’s denegation notwithstanding, an idée fixe, an idea that has become more and more ‘fixated,’ to the point of replacing all other ideas” (170-71).

Since Ortega y Gasset (“Goya y lo popular,” O.C. 7 ([1961]: 521-36) first questioned the cliché of Goya’s purported popularismo, pointing to his espousal of the ilustrado cause, the ambiguity of the painter’s vision has been recognized. Goya’s stance in Los desastres de la guerra is one of ironic detachment that criticizes both oppressor and oppressed alike. Barbara Rose, “Goya Then, Goya Now,” in Goya: “The Disasters of War” writes that Although Goya has been seen by popular writers as a political revolutionary on the side of the masses, everything in his art indicates that he thought the rabble were untrustworthy, ignorant and dangerous, and that he felt no more sympathy with them than with the corrupt powers that oppressed them. Goya’s stance is, above all, critical; however, the nature of his criticism is not propagandistic but universal... However, criticism that attacks both sides and includes images of self-mockery, indicates a degree of detachment that is not only modern but distinctly contemporary. (63, 65) 

Michael Ugarte, “Tiempo de silencio and the Language of Displacement,” Modern Language Notes 96 (March 1981): 340-57. It is his contention that “…the all-encompassing ironic mode of Martín-Santos, a mode of writing which undermines everything that is written, does not allow for a moral intention. The ironic nature of Tiempo give rise to linguistic play, intricate word associations and verbal excess” (346).

Rey includes Martín-Santos’s socioeconomic rectifications of Ortega’s thought in sect. 2.1.4 “Hombra y nación,” 201-38. On geographic factors in particular see 223-25.

O.C. 5: 597-626 “La elección en el amor.”